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PATTERNS OF TRANSFER 
1966-1973
Internationalisation: the “grand design”
Management Education as a Strategic Weapon:
At the end of 1966 McGeorge Bundy became the new president of the Ford 
Foundation. At that time he had a strong reputation as, an outstanding scholar, an 
entrepreneur in higher education (as former Dean of Harvard University) and as a 
political expert. His personal relationships went from Harvard intellectual elite to 
President Kennedy inner circles. Moreover, he maintained personal relationships 
with President Johnson’s staff. Bundy made some crucial changes in Ford 
Foundation’s organizational design. The most relevant changes were related to 
the Higher Education and Research program, it became independent from IA and 
consequently there was an erasure of a clean boundary between domestic and 
international activities in educational programs.
Outstanding figures in the IA area, like Shepard Stone and Joseph Slater had no 
more the role they played in the past, mnning the world to meet outstanding 
personalities, and selecting individuals and ideas to produce the “adhocratic 
design” of Atlantic partnership. Other officers moved from one program to 
another. This was particularly the case of Marshall Robinson who moved from 
the position of EDA’s director to the position of program officer in charge of the 
Division of Education and Research. Later on he became Head of Division and 
Vice President. From the point of view of the actors in International strategies 
these changes marked the sunset of what one could call the “Stone-Slater” era 
and the emergence of new staff, which implied, in the Higher Educational 
program, the creation of a Marshall Robinson team, with Mariam Chamberlain 
(who had been a Ford Foundation’s staff associate since 1956) and Peter de 
Janosi and in the European and International Affairs program (ElA) a new role 
for Francis Sutton. Previously Sutton had been the Foundation’s representative 
for East and Central Africa of the International Programs. With Bundy, he 
became an expert in the field of social and economic sciences in Western Europe, 
particularly in France. One should recall that at that time the Ford Foundation 
started to think that an office should be created in Paris.
Robinson, a trained economist who came from field activities, as former Dean of 




























































































long time in contact with Leland Bach whose role in the development of 
American “new look” in management education is well known57.
A former Ford Foundation officer, Waldemar A. Nielsen, who participated in 
many European ventures, wrote in his book on "The Big Foundations" that:
“The foundation's international programs, which some had thought might be Bundy's 
primary interest, were simultaneously given a lower priority than the domestic 
programs. The European segments, under a rapid succession of chiefs, almost 
disintegrated”.
Nielsen’s statement needs to be corrected on one point. Certainly, the Higher 
Education and Research division did not have the comprehensive concern with 
Europe as a geographic and political entry, as the International Affairs Program 
once had. During the period of McGeorge Bundy's presidency, Europe was not 
yet the core, but rather a part, of Ford Foundation's international design. The 
European segment, however, did not disintegrate but rather it was incorporated 
into a new philosophy of Foundation policies which should be analyzed in order 
to better understand Ford Foundation’s “grand design” in management education 
and its consequences in terms of cross-fertilization effects. The rationale of the 
important change which occurred in the mid-Sixties was clearly stated in a Ford 
Foundation report of December 1967:
‘The foundation has persistently sought ways in which we might improve international 
understanding, or strengthen capacities for solving international problems. Under the 
International Affairs program, we gave particular attention to the problems of Europe 
and the Atlantic Community, and to Japan as a major emerging industrial power, as 
well as to the general needs of international organizations and the understanding of 
international problems. Both these programs contributed notably to resources for 
understanding the Communist world and made beginnings in the delicate and uncertain, 
but necessary, task of building relations with it. The international division of the 
Foundation now inherits responsibility for these various activities. It has the 
opportunity and the challenge to bring into a coherent pattern our efforts in service of 
peace and international understanding.”58
From this point of view, the planning of the Foundation’s activities outside the 
Unites States was no longer simply a concern of the International Division. It 
became a Foundation-wide concern. This “new look” in international affairs 
implied primarily a larger conception of European programs,
57 Robert L. Gleeson and S. Schlossman, George Leland Bach and the Rebirth o f Graduate 
Management Education in the Unites States (1945-1975),
in “Selections”, Spring 1995, pp. 8-46.




























































































“both East and West and including the Soviet Union We must clarify, the report 
said- “our aims with respect to Western Europe. In the past this was a more 
straightforward matter than it is now, and not only because the old simplicities of 
NATO and the Cold War are gone. Viewing Europe from the perspective of an 
International Affairs program, the Foundation naturally gave prominence and 
precedence to broad international objectives. We have been directly concerned with 
strengthening the cohesion of Europe and the Atlantic area /../ An approach to Europe 
on the various fronts represented by the Foundation’s divisions raises a new set of 
questions. The Education and Research division does not have a comprehensive 
concern with Europe as a geographic and political entity, as the International Affairs 
program once had. But is concerned with Europe as one of the world’s great 
concentrations of intellectual and educational resources.”59
The emphasis was then on education as a strategic weapon and on cooperation 
strategies as an instrument to get Europeans involved in larger programs, creating 
a “common market of ideas” and bypassing their fear that the burgeoning 
numbers of university-trained people in the United States and the Soviet Union, 
would condemn a less abundantly provided Western Europe to slower progress 
and widening gaps, technological and otherwise (the “brain drain”). The rapid 
shift from “technological gap” to “managerial gap” which occurred precisely in 
the mid-Sixties, and its political implications were, as we shall see, part of this 
plot as active elements in stimulating European cooperation in international 
programs, promoting inter-European and Atlantic links and providing bridges to 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
In a report for the European and International Affairs programs Francis X. Sutton 
made some interesting remarks on this subject:
‘The American society was considered in a way a “model” for advanced industrial 
societies, a model to which Western Europe, although with necessary adjustments and 
some differences, would eventually come .Servan-Schreiber’s “Le Défi Américain” was 
based o this assumption. We call this an assumption because very little or no analytical 
research has ever gone into this. The United States was and by many still considered a 
“model” more by intuition than anything else. To day we can question such an 
assumption, or at the very least, we ought to look into the problem more analytically 
and more systematically. It would seem that one should be able to define a model for 
modern industrialized societies which does not coincide necessarily with the present 
state of the American society”.
One essential outcome of this statement was greater attention to comparative 
analysis which, according to Sutton, should be situated “between an academic 
Schylla and a parochial Charybdis”, in order to define general subjects such as 
the patterns of interdependence in the Western world. As well as specific 





























































































determine a substantial difference also in the way in which in Eastern Europe the 
individuals, institutions and societies at large respond to technological change”60 
and what is the rationale to distinguish developed and underdeveloped countries 
considering that there are not only national but also regional differences.
One of the most fundamental problems in making plans for an international 
outlook of Ford Foundation European programs was to define strategic sectors 
which could be placed at the intersection between International and Educational 
programs. Different signs indicated that management education could be one of 
these sectors.
A relevant sign came from President Johnson’s advisory staff (Francis Bator, 
George Christian and Walt Rostow): in December 1966, when President Johnson 
directed Ford Foundation’s new President, McGeorge Bundy, to explore the 
possibility of creating a study center to strengthen international cooperation and 
mutual understanding in common problems between East and West.
On December 15, 1966 in a News Conference at the White House, Bundy 
announced his official role in the project:
“The kind of problem we are dealing with here is that all advanced economies share the 
problems of efficiently managing, large and complicated enterprises, factories, cities, 
subway systems and airports, hospitals and multi-product farms” -Bundy declared- “A 
center that would bring together engineers, economists, managers, production experts 
and the like, both practitioners and academics, could grow into a center of learning- at 
least this is the hope of the president- that could help us all"61.
The decision taken by President Johnson followed a speech he gave (October 7 
1966) before the National Conference of Editorial Writers at New York during 
which he pronounced the famous sentence: “Americans and all the Europeans 
share a connection which transcends political differences. We are a single 
civilization; we share a common destiny; our future is a common challenge.”62
The implications of the President’s statement for management development and 
educational strategies were relevant and became evident in the following months. 
In February 1967, “The New Republic” gave attention to the fact that HAT and 
Renault contracts, to expand by several hundred percent the automobile 
production of the USSR, Rumania and Bulgaria, “followed a large-scale 
exchange of scientific-technological automotive information. Less publicity has
60 Francis X. Sutton, Conference on Foundation Programs in Europe , February 24-25, 1971, 
pp.9-10 [FFA, Report n° 004993],
61 [FFA, coll. ACC 91/10, Box, 45 Industrial Societies Project, January February 1967],
62 Address by President Johnson, Making Europe Whole: an Unfinished Task, Department of 




























































































been given to the agreement of the giant British Imperial Chemical Industries with 
the USSR covering plastics, petrochemicals and synthetic fibres Up to now, 
participation of American companies has been minor, and chiefly effected though 
European subsidiaries.”
The author of the article stressed the crucial shift implied in President Johnson’s 
statement:
“in the usual way of looking at things, international relations consist primarily of 
military and diplomatic interactions, plus trade. Recently increasing attention has been 
paid to “cultural” interactions and, on the economic side, to the balance of payments 
and foreign-aid policies. We are only just beginning to understand the phenomena of 
“international production” as something different from any of the above. International 
production is production generated by the conscious combination on a cooperative 
basis of the technology and / or management of two or more nations, or by the 
cooperative use of the management and technology of one nation with the labour and 
physical resources of another to the joint advantage of both”63.
The problem of attracting, to the project, both scientists and business leaders on 
the two fronts “West and East” was a main point of a long and very complicated 
negotiation which finally, in 1972, lead to the creation of IIASA. This point had 
been stressed since the beginning by Bundy-assistant Eugene Staples. “The 
exciting thing about this proposal,” -Staples observed- “and what should make it 
interesting to business leaders is the challenge to the private citizen- the industrial 
managers or the managerial inclined intellectual - to take the leadership in 
studying how to handle society’s largest problems”64. Accordingly, the long 
negotiation to transform the proposal in a “building-bridges” program revealed 
the process through which a top level international community of business leaders 
including; Aurelio Peccei, Raymond Aron, Giovanni Agnelli, Harold Wilson, 
Francis Bator and many others (who were personally contacted by Bundy or by 
his assistant Staples) developed the concrete feeling of its potential new role. This 
had important effects in the development of large-scale policies in management 
education.
Another effect was the possibility to select institutions and leading countries in 
cooperation strategies. As soon as the proposal became official many institutions 
and countries offered “hospitality” to such prestigious institutions. The French 
offered the beautiful castle in Fontainebleau, the Italians offered the new 
buildings of “Italia 61” in which the ILO was located. One should remember at
63 E. Benoit, “East-West Business Cooperation. A New Approach to Communist Europe”, in 
New Republic, February 18, 1967 p.21 and 23.
64 Eugene F. Staples Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, March 21, 1967, p.2[FFA, Reel 




























































































this point, that both Fiat and Olivetti were deeply involved in contacts and 
contracts with USSR.
Concerning Italy, it is not surprising that, despite increasing difficulties in 
developing management education65, this country was one of the cores of 
Bundy’s preliminary diplomatic activities to create the appropriate environment 
and political networks to support President Johnson’s initiative.
In a few months it became evident that from many points of view (including the 
necessity of locating the center in a truly neutral country like Austria, where in 
fact, the international Institute of Applied Systems Analysis, IIASA, was created 
in 1972), Italy was not the right emplacement to strengthen international and 
cooperation strategy. The memorandum written by James Howell on the 
negotiation between the Soviet representatives and ILO’s director, P. Blamont, in 
order to start a common project for training Soviet, American and European 
managers, is very revealing from this point of view. Howell wrote in 1969:
‘The whole atmosphere of the negotiations was “of the thirteenth hour”. Blamont was 
very anxious to give to Gvishani and his colleagues /../ exactly what they want /../ and 
insisted that bilateralism would not work /../ Blamont /../ doesn’t understand that 
/Soviets/ are interested in finding the state of the art and areas of research. He seems to 
think that they are simply interested in getting some high-level training for a few special 
people who can then return to the Soviet Union and teach others. This in not exactly 
wrong, but it is not the emphasis the Russians were giving.”
In the same year, as I mentioned above, Frederick wrote his report on Italian 
management education and pointed out the total absence of cooperation among 
Italian business schools. Things did not really change when the Agnelli 
Foundation entered the picture and supported the creation of ASFOR. Actually in 
the early seventies, Italy was at the periphery of Ford Foundation European 
programs. But this is partially another story. What is important to observe 
however, is the role played by management education in the President’s proposal, 
especially because it was a strong point of interest from the Soviet point of view. 
Secondly one should observe the crucial role played by Ford Foundation’s staff in 
all the processes of negotiation. This was considered a delicate matter in 
McGeorge Bundy’s official new conference at the White House, where Bundy 
was very clear on this point: “I am not undertaking this as an advance man for the 
Ford Foundation at all, but as an individual working at the request of the 
president”, he declared to the interviewer asking him about the financing of the 
center.
65 It is interesting to observe that when IPSOA activity came to an end in 1964, Givanni 




























































































It is certainly evident that President Johnson’s proposal and Ford Foundation’s 
programs in European management education were not part of the same design. 
Bundy also insisted that there was no connection between the proposal and the 
question of “technological gap”. Among all these subjects there were however 
some common areas. The role of the Ford Foundation staff could precisely be 
found at these intersections, created by a stream of actions of mutual information 
process within McGeorge Bundy’s team rather than by a strategic design to get 
the Foundation really involved in the project. Moreover it should be stressed that 
since the first general memorandum written in April 196766 the proposal of 
creating an international studies program was clearly oriented towards developing 
system analysis and computer technology rather than management education 
(which remained, however, a crucial interest of Soviet leading personalities like 
Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman State Committee of USSR Council of Ministers for 
Science and Technology). Nevertheless, in terms of “stream of actions”, as 
before, one should note a convergence of simultaneous activities which reinforced 
the strategic effect of management education program vis-à-vis different goals 
and targets. The main significant result was the development of cooperation 
behaviours as a complex system of practices in which there were many different 
factors.
First of all there was the exploitation of the large debate on the “managerial gap”, 
(one should not forget that Servan- Schreiber’s book The American Challenge 
was published precisely in 1967 and that in the other side of the Atlantic, 
MacNamara used, almost simultaneously the same expression), which was used 
to strengthen the process of transferring American educational patterns to 
European higher educational systems, by launching simultaneously different 
programs in social science and management. Secondly the possibility to control 
European expansion to the Eastern countries, and finally the opportunity to create 
the right and integrated (“international”) environment for the diffusion of 
American technology. The role of the actors and their mutual intersections in 
different programs was crucial in creating a process of rather uncoordinated 
actions which, in the middle period, supported what I call a ‘design’ effect.
It is less than a strategic plan, because it is the product of rather uncoordinated 
actions, its strategic effects were, nevertheless, relevant. It implies, in fact, a 
process of consolidation of a “vision” in which cooperation and, with stronger 
evidence since the early Seventies, competitive cooperation played the role of 
“actants” in cross-fertilization policies, rather than a mere ideological function.
66 An outline fo r  an international research center and international studies program for  




























































































When analyzing and comparing the different files in the archives of the Ford 
Foundation, there is some evidence to suggest, that without the political and 
theoretical environment produced by President Johnson’s proposal, the 
development of Ford Foundation’s management education program could have 
been different, probably more centered if not limited to Western Europe. One 
should however note that the Foundation’s first programs on Eastern Europe 
management education anticipated President Johnson’s initiative.
Actually the first step of the actors who were asked to give a contribution in 
developing in President Johnson’s proposal, was to activate the previous know­
how on Eastern countries and USSR, in terms of environmental and network 
knowledge. Marshall Robinson for example contacted his former colleagues at 
the University of Pittsburgh who had already established relations with Eastern 
European scholars. One of them Bernard Bass wrote to Robinson, in December 
1966, giving him some interesting information on Jerman Gvishiani, a key 
personality in USSR scientific policies, and of his strong interest on American 
teaching programs in organizational psychology, as well as on other scholars in 
Poland and Yugoslavia who could be useful to develop the project.
Since the period during which he directed the EDA program, Marshall Robinson 
had collected a number of reports referring to the programs of different schools of 
management and engineering in the US which had tried to develop cooperation 
programs with the Iron curtain countries. Harvard Business School was 
underrepresented in the list of the institutions, (the MIT, Stanford and Carnegie 
Tech), who took part to the pioneer phase of Eastern programs. This orientation 
was still evident when Bundy prepared the list of scholars to contact for the 
International center - “A group of non-Harvard economists”, (likewise noted in 
different memoranda, Bach, Gordon and Simon).
In one of the reports form MIT staff in 1965 it was clearly stated that since the 
early Sixties,
“in the USSR there has been an extensive re-examination of the structure and 
organization in industry and significant changes have been made to decentralize 
planning and decision-making in a number of consumer good lines /../ Most of the 
Eastern European countries have taken steps to decentralize planning and introduce a 
number of features of a marked economy into their economic structures. Their 
economies may develop in such directions much more rapidly than Soviet Union 
because of the existence and recollection of market economies in such countries less 




























































































countries as evidence by a growing number of request to ILO for aid in establishing 
management training”67.
This shift in Eastern countries met with, in the mid-Sixties, crucial changes in 
some European countries, especially in France, where the De Gaulle nationalistic 
approach was mitigated by the role played by a gaullist, left-wing intelligentsia 
(Servan Schreiber and the “Express” group”) and, from another side, by the basic 
agreement of these groups vis-à-vis the positions of “ Monnet people” who 
strongly supported the idea of integrating liberal economy patterns within 
planification policies. Thus, planification became progressively a pattern within 
cooperation programs and in European countries which developed these kind of 
policies in economy as well as in education (i.e. development of applied social 
research both within the administration and the enterprise) there emerged possible 
channels to intensify relations with Eastern countries and USSR. Therefore, 
should one consider as a mere hazard the fact that Fernand Braudel (the famous 
historian and admired leader of the VI section of the EPHE in Paris) invited to 
give an official speech in Warsaw, in 1967, choose a revealing title, “L’histoire 
opérationnelle”, which evokes precisely the intersection between applied social 
science and “operational research”?. (I shall return to the strategic role of France 
in Ford Foundation policies, once I have analyzed the general lines of the 
Foundation’s policy in European management education since 1967).
Dominant Patterns and Differentiated Effects: Professionalization by 
Research and Receptors’ Behaviour
In 1966 Marshall Robinson wrote a paper Management Education: A new 
Imperialism, to which a proposal was attached concerning a Business 
Management Development Program. This program was “designed to build- 
through management education- a stronger Atlantic Community capable of 
meeting the urgent demands of the 1970’s and 1980’s”. It was conceived in three 
phases:
1) A survey of European business schools;
2) A policy conference; and
3) Stimulation of programs on a transatlantic basis.
The formal launching of the Ford Foundation's program occurred a few months 
later and the production of national reports was effectively one of the first steps 
implement by the program.
67 Howard J. Johnson, Carroll L. Wilson, Proposal for Support o f M.I.T. Sloan School 
Faculty. Field Study and Seminar in Moscow, August 1966, on Competitive Management 




























































































An overall view of the European Management Education program reveals that it 
involved 47 major grant actions and 81 doctoral fellowship grants. Excluding 
individual fellowships, grant sizes ranged from $1,000,000 to $3,000. The 
average duration of grant action with a programmatic character was 2 years. The 
European program was organized under different main approaches, 
corresponding to different needs and organizational strategies. Then it was not a 
one-way program. On the contrary it implied experimental and articulated side- 
streets. It was however based on some formal, standard requirements which 
fundamentally excluded pure “capital venture” investments68.
First of all, national governments should co-operate by financing programs; 
secondly a relevant factor in selecting the institutions, associations and 
individuals was the fact that the grant should be basically directed at developing 
professional training through research. The lack of the first requirement had a 
crucial role for example, in excluding Spain from Ford Foundation’s grants, 
despite interesting institutional developments which had occurred in that country 
during the sixties. Lack of research strategies and moreover the impossibility to 
activate networks of cooperation among the leading business schools- as stated in 
Frederick’s report on Spain - were considered more relevant than the role of 
Opus Dei at IESE as it was easy to suspect!69
Many grants were devoted to "institutional development", that is to strengthen 
institutions which were mostly, but not exclusively, non university training 
centres. This occurred in two ways:
a) by creating professional deanships and strengthening the creation of a 
permanent Faculty, as it was the case for INSEAD ($1,000,000 on a partial 
matching basis) and for CEI (Centre d'Etudes Industrielles in Geneva $250,000); 
and
68 This orientation produced some criticism in FF’s International division staff See for example 
Francis X. Sutton Conference of FF Programs in Europe of February 11, 1971, pp.7-8 [FFA, 
Report n° 004993] “In large part of the world”- Sutton observed- “the foundation invests 
importantly in pilot ventures and projects /../ Characteristically, any pilot venture must deal 
with the concrete features of the country and the institutions within which it occurs. In 
western Europe we face an inhibition in pursuing program and objectives through pilot 
ventures because of our conception that such ventures ought to be financed within the 
countries themselves. Is there not a resulting tendency for us to be more academically and 
research-oriented in Europe than we talk, and than we perhaps ought to be, because of this 
inhibition?”.
69 M. Robinson Memorandum to J. Slater Management education in Spain , May 24, 1966 




























































































b) by improving research staff and training in support of doctoral programs, as 
was the case for the London Graduate School of Business Studies and the 
Manchester Business School in the United Kingdom and for CEROG (Centre de 
Recherche en Sciences de l'Organisation) in France ($ 300,000). CEROG was 
conceived as an implementation, at post-graduate level, of the activities of the 
already existing IAE - Instituts d’Administration des Affaires (created in 1955 by 
Pierre Tabatoni, as Institutes of the Faculties of Law, with the enthusiastic 
agreement of Gaston Berger, the dynamic Directeur de l'Enseignement 
Supérieur).
Other grants were devoted to "visits and exchanges" from both sides of the 
Atlantic, whose goal was strengthening European institutions. This was the case 
of the grant to the Stockholm School of Economics whose aim was to bring 
specialists from different countries to Stockholm in order to enrich the school 
curriculum and research standards.
A third type of support was related to "networks building". This is a very rich and 
interesting chapter of the Ford Foundation saga in Europe and deserves special 
attention in this paper.
Most of the grants were devoted to "starting and strengthening research centres". 
In the United Kingdom, the University of Warwick was given a $250,000 grant 
for the establishment of a Centre for Industrial and Business Studies within the 
School of Social Sciences. Another grant ($100,000) went to the International 
Institute for Management of Technology, sponsored by OECD and established in 
Milan in 1971.1 shall return to this case study later.
The largest amount of financing ($1,000,000) was devoted to the doctoral 
fellowships which allowed young European teachers to go to the U.S. graduate 
schools to do their doctoral studies at one of the 12 participating U.S. graduate 
schools of management. At the end of this period the participants were required 
to return to Europe to an academic career. As expected not all fellows returned to 
Europe, many of them preferred to find a job in an American multinational firm or 
to teach in an American school. This was one of the reasons why the Ford 
Foundation decided to simultaneously develop European networks and encourage 
doctoral programs in the most important business schools, according to a more 
general trend which characterised US-European relationships during the mid­
sixties which was inspired by the philosophy of the "equal partnership".
Ford Foundation’s program in European management education was not the 
product of a once and for all established strategy. It should be considered, on the 




























































































had a common background in developing internationalization both as a pattern of 
a professonalized business elite and of educational institutions and in activating 
cooperation behaviours and as a tool to implement interactive strategies between 
Western countries and Eastern countries. The result of this stream of actions was 
partly the product of a differentiated program which accurately selected countries 
and institutions which seemed to fill strategic patterns and technical requirements.
It was also the effect of the system reaction of “receiving actors” who created 
cross-fertilization processes by adopting behaviours of selective appropriation of 
American models. This kind of behaviour reveals different levels, going from:
a) the apparent acceptance and imitation of American patterns, as in the case of 
Italy and Spain (however based on a strong resistance to introduce cooperation 
strategies and, especially in the Italian case and on an equally strong resistance to 
develop research as a basic factor in professonalization of management):to
b ) an interactive behaviour which consciously tried to adapt Foundation’s 
programs to national, institutional-educational patterns and international strategies 
(as was the case in France and Belgium): to
c) dynamic changes occurring in the entrepreneurial context (as was the case for 
Britain in the mid-Sixties): or to
d) rapid shifts in educational environment (as was to some extent, the case for 
Germany in the late Sixties, where an important reform of Polytechnics curricula 
occurred).
One should also consider the different level of synergy of other programs in the 
social sciences and management education, Italy and France represent opposite 
issues of this kind of effect. In terms of implementation of research to develop a 
professionalized management elite, Ford Foundation’s social science programs in 
Italy, which were systematically launched since 1958 with a “density” 
comparable to the French programs in the same field, generated a situation of 
basic “gaspillage”. This was partially compensated by some exceptional results, 
like the “Portici” Institute in Naples and to some extent the first period of 
SVIMEZ activity. The basic element of resistance was the maintenance of an 
autocratic structure both within the industrial environment and in the University 
system, followed after 1968 by a period of political struggles and by the total lack 
of organizational support for research and training outside the University which 
could stimulate dynamic change. Despite pressures, coming significantly from 
IPSOA’s Diaspora, the Faculty of Engineering failed to reform their curricula, 
and until the mid-Seventies the Faculty of Economics’ curricula were dominated 
by business economics, which practically meant that accounting overshadowed 
all the other disciplines. Particularly crucial was the total absence of non-profit 





























































































In France, on the contrary, non profit institutions (like MSH which developed a 
large program in social science and humanities) and state supported Foundations 
(like the Fondation Nationale de Sciences Politiques) along with the role played 
by some leading personalities in higher education systems as well as in the 
entrepreneurial milieu, supported a social transition. A transition during which an 
industrial elite largely dominated by production engineers, “gestion” experts, 
trained in commercial disciplines and accounting, and poly-technicians with a 
“classical” education in mathematics and deductive methods, was progressively 
integrated by a new generation of managers trained in marketing, operational 
analysis and behaviour sciences, with a strong orientation to develop applied 
analysis and research. The role of institutions outside the “Etat enseignant” 
control was equally important in integrating research and teaching, especially in 
economics and in the social sciences. Among the factors which shaped Ford 
Foundation’s role in Europe, as an effect of selective appropriations rather than of 
a mere transfer of models, one should consider also the fact that although in the 
late sixties and early seventies, the Foundation was certainly the main actor in 
management education development it was not the unique one. Since 1963 
OECD, with the publication of a detailed report on European management 
education, “Problèmes et Perspectives de la Formation à l’Administration des 
Enterprises”, started to have a role in the field which became especially crucial in 
the early Seventies. Harvard Business School, alone, or with Ford Foundation’s 
partial support, equally continued to play an important role, particularly where the 
Foundation was not active with direct grants, as it was the case for Spain and 
Italy, in the late Sixties and during the seventies70 as well as for some institutions, 
like IMEDE in Switzerland. In Spain and Italy a crucial impact was produced by 
the International Teachers Program which was a main Harvard Business School’s 
fertilization product. Actually, the new generation of Italian professional mangers, 
after the creation of SDA by Bocconi in Milan (a private University which had 
been characterized during the Fifties and the early Sixties by a strong resistance 
to the case method instruction) should be considered, to some extent, as an ITP 
product.
From the point of view of the development of ITP, Harvard-Ford cooperation 
programs were characterised by an increasing level of complexity. Since the early
70 Actually the only programs which were started in Italy concerned the development of studies 
on the situation of managers and business elite in the country (with a $ 150,000 in 1969 which 
was renewed in 1972 with $ 60,000) in relation with the research activity of C.R.I.S. 
(Research Center on Industrial Sociology) in Turin founded by Flavia Derossi, Magda 
Talamo and Anna Anfossi and a program of ISIDA in Palermo on “The Evaluation of 
management training programs” with a $50,000 grant in 1972).directed by G. Morello. It is 




























































































Seventies the Foundation had supported, in fact, European pressures towards a 
process of autonomisation and ‘decentralization” of the ITP program, which led 
to the creation of a European consortium and to a progressive implementation of 
the production of European case studies, which were not merely the result of a 
selection produced by Harvard professors, in order to improve their teaching 
performance on international business in the HBS courses. Harvard Business 
School however, continued to play a central role in Europe, firstly with the 
creation of a European HBS satellite in Switzerland at the Mont Pellerin, (with 
the cooperation of IMEDE Faculty and the strong opposition of INSEAD and of 
other leading business schools) and secondly with the creation of a Harvard case 
study collection, which was considered a basic requirement to develop 
management education especially in the European countries in which autonomous 
research was slowly and poorly developed.
l.German obstinacy and its historical variations
The case of Germany, which has been extensively analyzed by Robert Locke, 
(Locke 1989 and 1996) represents, essentially, a level of strong obstinacy 
regarding the introduction of American patterns. Actually the United States and 
Germany represent two alternative approaches to business education. The 
German dominant model is based on business economics (BWL) and focused on 
the economic aspects of firms. Its goal is knowledge for the sake of knowledge 
without any link not only to the problem of how to apply knowledge which is 
central in the American model but also, as stated by Hartman Heinz in 1956, in a 
Report to the O.E.C.E, without any emphasis on the problem of social 
responsible business leadership, on the interrelationship among the various 
branches of management and on the role of empirical and inductive 
investigations.
Some questions arise from these general considerations: resistance is a permanent 
feature of German management educational development? Is it depending only on 
educational patterns? Should one attribute educational strategies to a diffused 
anti-Americanism among business leaders or German industrialists’ behavior, 
with regards to American patterns, was rather one of the effects of a kind of 
skepticism vis-à-vis the free market, related to the tremendous effort to rebuild 
German economy after World War II.? Let me start from this last question.
An interesting and revealing case study on this matter is related to the project of a 
Management Development Institute in Berlin, which was envisaged in 1957, 
thanks to the initiative of the Berlin Chamber of Industry and Commerce- coming 




























































































management-intellectuals and industrialists in Cologne, and Minister Erhard’s 
agreement It attired the enthusiastic attention of Ford Foundation’s leading 
personalities- especially Thomas H. Carroll and Shepard Stone -, the American 
Embassy in Bad Godesbergand and the American Department of State. A report 
to the Department of State referred that the project represented
“a change in the attitude of the Cologne institute, which was organised by and has the 
active support of the Bundersverein des Deutchen Industrie and which for some time 
had looked with distinct disfavor on the Berlin Program. Apparently the Cologne group 
was afraid that the Berlin program would interfere with the Baden-Baden seminars 
organised by the Cologne organisation , and, further that the Berlin institute would fail 
under the control of the Federal Government or Berlin City Government” 7I.
The discussion which developed through the first informal contacts between 
Berlin representatives and Western Germany large-firm industrialists reveals, as it 
was stated in the Report, that the attitude of all the businessmen was officially 
based on the complaint is that the courses have too much of the “lectures 
method” and that they provide no opportunity for effective participation on the 
part of the student. This attitude among businessmen in Western Germany should 
help to find acceptance of the Berlin program, which is participation oriented”. 
The crucial problems however were the location of the institute in Berlin and the 
fact “that a school controlled in any large measure by government would not 
receive much support from private industry 72.
The discussion, which involved Thomas Carroll, reveals also the increasing 
strategic dimension of management development in one of the most crucial 
periods of European integration. 1957 was both the year of the treaty of Rome of 
the re-election of Adenaurer in Germany and, last but not least, of the creation of 
INSEAD (with Ford Foundation’s and EPA’s support) which developed a strong 
attention in catching German firms participation to the new education enterprise 
in Fontaineableau. Thomas Carroll’s commitment to the Institute’s project is 
clearly revealed in a report written in 1956 by Carroll himself and by Thomas L. 
Norton professor of Management at the School of Commerce of the New York 
University and former President of the American Association of Collegiate 
Schools of Business) on Education for Management in Berlin . It has been 
commissioned by the ICA, the US Department of State and the Government of 
the Federal Republic in Germany, with respect to the possibilities of the 
establishment in Berlin of a program of education for management. “A great
71 Unclassified Foreign Service Despatch, form USBER to Department of State, Washington, 
1957 CERP section D, Item IV-B-R, Recent Developments in the Plan for an Institute for 
Executive Development in Berlin [FFA Log 58-187, Reel n° 1958 L 44],




























































































many documents relating to business activities and to existing educational efforts, 
as well as several reports of previous investigating groups,- the report stated- 
were examined. In addition conferences were held with official of the E.P.A.” It 
also stated that the segment of educational marked to be developed in Germany 
was that of medium-size firms, rather than that of large firms. “The few which 
have established “schools “have typically looked upon their own facilities as 
supplementary rather than an alternative to outside programs”.73 The map of 
institutions offering management seminars in Germany, described by Carroll and 
Norton is rather impressive and reveals the changing attitude of a new generation 
of businessmen with respect to the traditional educational and training patterns. 
Nevertheless the authors did not recommended to develop in Germany the kind of 
transplant of American patterns, teaching staff and material which characterised 
the IPSOA’s experiment in Turin. Actually after the IPSOA experiment American 
officers were perfectly aware of the difficulties to transplant the case method 
approach in a context which was not ready to accept its cognitive patterns. 
Considering both the differentiated experience and curricula of several leading 
American Business schools and the recent development of management training 
in Germany, they recommended instead a strategy of progressive experimentation 
of training patterns (“the lecture method should seldom be used”) to be realised 
through a four-six week course and with a careful attention to the specific 
configuration of German executives’ cultural and operational environment, in 
order to gradually develop abilities of the participants.and “to enhance the 
capacity for making judgements, and to inculcate more broadly based attitudes 
and points of view”. They supported the idea of establishing in Berlin a German 
Institute for Executive development
“which will offer a truly German, full time and residential program, based upon the 
fully recognition from the outset of the particular conditions of the country, in which 
German Personnel would fill post of administrative and teaching responsibility, and in 
which the greatest possible amount of German material would be used. The 
employment of Americans or other foreign personnel /  should be considered/ in a 
purely advisory capacity .The real aim is to change the attitude of participants 
executives. The participants should be trained to view problems from an over-all 
company point rather than that of a staff specialist or a specialized line manager”.
The location in Berlin had evident political reasons related to the necessity to 
exploit the opportunities which seemed to be connected with a new trend in 
international relations and with the confident and enthusiastic spirit
“in Berlin, among business, educational and governmental leaders the like of which we 
did not observe to the same extent elsewhere in the Federal Republic. In addition -
73 Thomas H. Carroll and Thomas L. Norton, Education for Management in Berlin, October 




























































































Carroll and Norton stated - we believe there are educators associated with the Freie 
Universitat, the Technischen Universitat, Deutches Istitut fur Wirtschaftforschung and 
the Hochschule - Institut fur Wirtschaftskund in the city of Berlin who posses the 
interest in and dedication to the objectives of a program such as been outlined for the 
proposed institute ... which should be established and operated as a non profit 
organisation, independent of any other educational institution /including universities/ or 
any business association”.
American officials from the United States Mission in Berlin and from the Office 
of German Affairs of the Department of State in Washington claimed that the 
reasons against the creation of such an institute depended mainly on the 
“difficulty to make the program which we are planning for Berlin superior to the 
one offered twice a year in Baden Baden by the BDI”. But one could argue that 
the most relevant reason to drop the project depended on the attitude of large 
firms’ businessmen (like Otto Friedrich in Hamburg, Herman Abs74 in Frankfurt 
and also W.D. von Witzleben from Siemens) who were more interested in 
developing a management education program for the common market (INSEAD 
attired the attention at that time!!) or in strengthening the already existing 
instituions, by expanding their contacts with American business schools, rather 
than in creating a German national school. In a letter to Frederick E. Scheven, 
Chief Commerce and Industry Branch of the U.S. Mission in Berlin, who 
supported the industrialists point of view, Carroll clearly evoked the main issue in 
institutional competition, which was INSEAD rather than the national Institute in 
Berlin :
“I do not believe that the BDI program and the one outlined for Berlin are really 
competitive- Carroll wrote-... As you may know, there are plans afoot, under the 
auspices of the Paris Chamber of Commerce to establish/ a European, common market 
program of management education/” .75
In May 1958, considering the strong resistance of German business leaders 
Carroll decided to abandon his plan with the following consideration:
“I do not think that either of these gentleman appreciated fully the potentialities of a 
German adaptation of the American approach to management development training in 
institutions which may not be associated with universities”
The reason of leading businessmen’s resistance was however much more 
complex than a simple “anti-Americanism” and competition was based on factors 
which were not the simple effect of institutional strategies in creating new
H. Abbs letter to Shepard Stone, March 15, 1958 [FFA Log 58-187, Reel n° 1958 L 44.]
75 Thomas H. Carroll Letter to Frederick E. Scheven 8 January 1958, [FFA Log 58-187, Reel 




























































































business schools. In the late Fifties they were basically related to big 
businessmen’s’ scepticism with respect to the Common European Market and the 
expansion of the free market, as stated in Otto Friedrich’s “memorandum” to 
Shepard Stone to support his reaction against the creation of a National 
Management Institute in Berlin : “Industry and trade- Friedrich wrote- are subject 
to a degree of free competition under professor Erhard’s political promotion 
which goes beyond the pre-war competition and beyond the more restrictive and 
dirigistic market conditions which the Germans find in other European 
countries”.76'77
Modem Germany historian Volker Berghahn demonstrates that even during the 
Fifties “Projectionist arrangements continued, and the government- even one led 
by Erhard, the neo-liberal Economic Minister- was prepared to lend a hand when 
it came to favouring indigenous industries vis-à-vis foreign firms that had invested 
directly in the Federal Republic”. Displacing in Berlin “new initiatives” on 
management education and giving them an international configuration was part of 
the same logic: according to Friedrich managers’ trainingin Germany should 
follow the principles of commitment to self-determination, co-operation and co­
ordination which characterise individual enterprises. “The Firm - he wrote- is 
comparable to the family, a safe retreat for man and his personal freedom in his 
struggle with the demands of advancing techniques and organisation”.78
This defence attitude was the product of an historical period. It is important to 
emphasise that
“we are only just beginning to appreciate how deeply internment, de-Nazification, ad 
the trials of prominent industrialists at Nuremberg traumatised an entire older 
generation of German entrepreneurs and managers. While with the acceleration of East- 
West confrontation, these resentments and feelings of bitterness were gradually 
overwhelmed by a desire to co-operate with the Allies in the defence of Western 
Europe against communism...many German managers continued to be skeptical that the 
Open Door the U.S. were working so hard to establish would work and survive”.79
76 Otto A. Friedrich, Memorandum to Shepard Stone, March 29, 1958, pp. 3-4 [FFA Log 58- 
187, Reel n° 1958 L 44],
77 Volker R. Berghahn, “German Big Business and the Quest for a European Economic
Empire in the Twentieth Century”, in Volker R. Berghanh (ed.), Quest fo r Economic Empire. 
European Strategies o f German Big Business in the Twentieth Century, Oxford, 1996, p. 26. 
7! Otto A Friedrich, The Phoenix History on the 100th Anniversary o f the Phoenix 
Gummiwerke A.G. 1856-1956, [FFA Log 58-187, Reel n° 1958 L 44],
79 Volker R. Berghanh, Lowering Soviet Expectations. West German Industry and Oslhndel 




























































































During the Sixties and particularly in the mid Sixties a different configuration 
emerged, largely as a consequence of a stronger integration of German business 
community within EEC political and economic co-peration strategies. From the 
point of view of management training, the 1960’s orientation recalls to some 
extents the process of “selective adaptation” of American patterns within the 
German context that Carroll and Norton suggested in their report of 1956, as a 
pattern of dialogue between the German and the American patterns
Despite divergent institutional and theoretical patterns, as we said, despite their 
effects in the social construction of knowledge, some points of contact between 
the American models and the German tradition were produced as historical 
effects of the dynamic of the mid and late Sixties, starting from a movement of 
pressure of leading businessmen, clearly expressed in a meeting held by Hans 
Dichgans in 1965.80 Particularly relevant was the role played by German
industrialists and educational entrepreneurs (like Ludwig Vaubel, Horst Albach
81
and Walther Busse von Colbe) in diffusing post-experience and in-company 
management training, largely based on American models. This new orientation 
had certainly its historical antecedent in the Baden-Badener
Untemehmergeprache, organised since 1954 by the Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie- BDI- and USW- Universitatseminar des Wirtschaft. The 
BDI, about three weeks in length, has been given twice a year, with lecturers who 
were primarily leading businessmen and the opportunity for participants to ask 
questions and to discuss the problems.
A relevant factor was University reform in the late 1960s. It produced structural 
changes in German University governance which facilitated transformations in 
University curricula. The responsibility for the organization of the curricula was 
transferred from the full professors to the university faculties where all the 
academic staff had voting rights. Consequently new disciplines, like cost 
accounting and industrial psychology, were introduced into the traditional 
curricula of business economics. However the resistance of Wissenschafts 
tradition with its separation of praxis and theory and the domination of scientific 
specialization in field of knowledge remained a strong obstacle to the diffusion of 
generalist management training. For this reason the main changes in business 
training occurred principally outside the University and in private schools like the 
Wissensschaftliche Hochschule fur Untemehmensfuhrung in Koblenz. Something 
similar occurred in Italy where the dominant role of the Economia Aziendale,
111 H. Dichgans, "Erst mit dreissig im Beruf? Vorschlage zur Bildungsreform”, in Der 
Konferenz der Kulturminister und der Westdeuschen Rektorenkonferenz hoffnungsvoll 
gewidmet, Stuttgart, 1966.




























































































within the Schools of Commerce (especially the Bocconi) and the Faculty of 
Economics, delayed the introduction of management studies within the University 
system. But unlike the Italian case the strong and increasing integration of 
German companies within the EEC- especially during the Seventies- deeply 
affected the organizational structure and managerial hierarchies of German high 
technology industries and produce an important shift from the situation of the late 
Fifties. This shift had two main consequences. The first one was the strengthening 
of a traditional cooperation between the industrialists and the Hochschulen, 
which in the late Sixties became Fachochschulen and reformed their curricula 
with the introduction of new disciplines, as stated before. One should recall that 
since the 1920’s programs had existed in some German engineering schools to 
train economics-engineers, especially in cost-accounting methods. These have 
been rapidly adopted by German industry (with results not dissimilar to those 
occurring in France, despite the differences concerning the institutional and 
theoretical background). The second relevant consequence was the progressive 
insertion of German experts within the European business schools networks 
(EAMTC, EIASM). This statement helps perhaps to explain why German 
attempts to reform management training attired, again, the attention of the Ford 
Foundation’s officers in the late Sixties. It was certainly a selective attention82. 
Was it a mere coincidence that the main point of interaction between Ford 
Foundation, which in the mid-Sixties was launching, its “grand design” for 
European management education, and German educational institutions was 
located in Cologne, in which the initiative to contact the Ford Foundation was 
taken by A. Schmolders, pro-rector of that University? Actually at Cologne 
Schmalenbach developed, since the Twenties, cost accounting research and some 
decades before, in 1879, Gustav von Mevissen, Rhenish industrialist and
Despite pressures the Ford Foundation did not grant the International Management Insitute 
in Berlin which, despite its name, had nothing in common with the proposal supported in 
1956 by Thomas Carroll Its origin, as stated in an article by Eleanor Dulles (who in 1956 
voted against I project!) published by the “Atlantic Community Quarterly” in 1973, p. 70: ”is 
said to have been before the recent agreements of 1970-72 in discussion between SDP deputy 
chairman and floor leader Herbert Webner and others after the Soviet Take-over in Prague in 
1968. It was then decided that the USSR was in a position to exert military pressure almost at 
will directly or through its surrogates and that it appeared that the most effective counter­
action would be a strengthening of the intellectual life as contrasted with the political. Thus 
the idea emerged to create international institutes of world prominence to be established in 
Berlin”. Ford Foundation’s refusal to support the Institute marks to some extent a continuity 
with respect to the statement made in 1956 by Carroll when he resisted to the idea of a shift 
of his proposal of a national institute for management education into an Common Market 
business school. “I think- Thomas Carroll stated at that time- that a truly educational program 
would not deal so much with ‘tasks and problems of the moment’, but would increase the 
potentialities of the participants to cope with future problems as they arise” Thomas H. 




























































































politician had the idea of creating a Handelschochschule whose goal was to train 
business men in the art of applying knowledge. According to Hans.Dieter.Meyer 
the Handelshochschule. which were created in different German cities, were 
largely based on American patterns (Meyer, 1996). From this point of view, after 
three decades of German resistance to become an active partner in the 
Fontainebleau institute’s successful expansion, is the recent creation of a German 
INSEAD in Lipsia (where the first Handelschochschule became operational in 
1898) a simple coincidence? Should one then consider that even German 
“obstinacy” has a differentiated geography which is based, as in the case of 
Cologne, on a selected historical memory of the years during which the 
Handelshochschulen tried (and failed) to be transformed into business schools 
type institutions? Should one consider that this obstinacy also found a limit in the 
behavior of leading German industrialists who, despite a phase of economic and 
“institutional” protectionism during the Fifties, nevertheless developed, 
management strategies which are largely inspired by American patterns?
2. Britain. Tansfer of models and social resistence
If Germany basically represents a case of evident resistence other national 
contexts reveals more ambivalent patterns.
This was particularly the case of Britain and Italy, where management, did not 
reach the status of an academic discipline until the end of the Fifties and even 
later.
In both cases resistance developed as an hidden factor, especially in Britain, 
where enthusiasm towards American management, was the product of “disparate, 
even competing, interests” (Tiratsoo 1996) rather than of a clear and general 
willingness to transplant American models.
In Italy hidden resistance was reinforced by the role of politics on educational 
policies and by the extremely limited development of interdisciplinary research 
which reduced the possibility of standardization of innovative work.
Despite the large number of attempts to introduce business administration 
curricula in several British educational institutions since the inter-wars period83 a 
systematic action in this direction took place only in the Sixties. It came out in 
particular through the action of a new organization, the Foundation for
83 The first school of management, as a Department of Industrial Administration, was created 
in Manchester in 1918 in the College of Technology, rapidly followed by other schools of 




























































































Management Education which” brought together under the flag of passionate 
admiration for the American system “one or two Harvard Alumni, several Tory 
M.P.S., the Chairman of the University Grants Committee and at least one 
recipient of Ford Foundation generosity” (Tiratsoo, 1996).
In 1963, the Parliamentary commission on Higher education, under the 
chairmanship of Lord Robbins, concluded that a major effort to establish high 
level business studies was necessary for the national interest. This report was 
followed by Lord Franks’ report on British business schools at the graduate level, 
one was to be jontly associated with the London School of Economics and 
Imperial College of the University of London and the other was to be associated 
with the Manchester University. Despite a climate of tensions and divisions, 
which produced controversial interpetations on how to conceive the new business 
schools (within or outside the University system, dependent or independent from 
the industrial system and its immediate needs; a curriculum to be based on 
accountancy or, on the contrary, teaching of a wide range of social sciences) and 
thanks to the role of mediator played by Lord Franks, two schools were 
established in 1965. Financial support of over £5 million came from the business 
community, as a result of the fund raising campaign for the new bom enterprises, 
promoted by the Foundation for Management Education, which acted as the main 
pressure group to create Harvard-type institutions.
The Ford Foundation contributed with grants of $1,000,000 for both the schools. 
In the following years Ford Foundation aided the University of Warwick to 
develop a management science research program with $250,000. Ford Foundation 
strategic role was to act, along with FME, as the catalyser of pressure groups 
which represented only a part of a business community, which, moreover, as 
Charles Maier correctly observed, “did not possess the cultural hegemony”. From 
this point of view, in the British case, a basic transplant of the MBA models 
occurred in a situation of compromise which affected the subsequent 
development of the system.
As a general evidence, the British tradition was characterized before the Fifties 
by prevalence of “subsidiary courses in industrial engineering approach for 
students taking engineering degree”84, which was a different path from HBS’ 
model. This historical and institutional background certainly had some positive 
effects, in terms of short period tactic, in producing the kind of compromises 
which characterized the “sometimes half-hearted” commitment to transplant of
84 P. Armostrong, The Abandonment o f Productive Intervention in Management Teaching 





























































































American models. But, in the long term, along with the basic weakness of the 
British management movement, the historical background reinforced resistance to 
a strong and deep integration of American models within the British system, in 
which the dominant mental habitus still remained that of “learning by doing”..
The compromise behavior did not evolve in a process of true hybridization 
between British and American management: it rather produced an increasing 
difficult tactical combination of different patterns and the discordant cohabitation 
of British industrial engineering tradition and American management formal 
thought. Moreover compromises also affected the istitutional life and 
organizational strategies of the new business schools. They were evident 
especially in the case of Manchester business school, particularly concerning the 
development of research which was considered crucial by Ford Foundation’s 
“donors”. A kind ofcompromise between the American model and the traditional 
British patterns was established at level of a doctoral degree program: a single 
research topic was patterned along the lines of American degree program which 
required a greater amount of advance course work. Despite the successful 
creation of academic channels for developing MBA curricula, strong resistance 
was still evident in the British social and industrial environment. Given the 
generally strong aversion to academic qualifications in most business quarters 
which became stronger when the dominant pattern in training strategies was 
perceived as a kind of universalistic applied behavior science, the “space of 
qualification” for British managers was significantly different from the American 
contex. A main difference with the Italian case, at least until the early 
seventieswas that the MBA was accepted withi the British aademic system. It had 
however a limited “market” within the business environment. The development of 
MBA was also limited by “technical-organizational” facors such as the matching 
strategy implied in the Franks report. This strarategy was very close to Ford 
Foundation’s basic policy of getting governments involved in the creation of new 
institutions: the schools should raise their funding in equal shares from the 
government and the business. Actually the “Manchester experiment” could be 
characterized as an attempt to balance American pressure to consider research 
"d ’abord!” with a strong development of executive programs. This orientation 
was supported by a more general tendency to develop criticism towards 
American models which is represented in EPA’s report written by King and 
Gregoire in the late fifties, as previously stated. The main question related to the 
British case is whether or not it developed as a rather ambiguous consolidation of 
a compromise between a non-academic truck and a process of soft 
academicization, with increasingly diminishing input towards research strategies. 
Personally I would argue that the lack of consideration of “national intellectual 
patterns”, (that is the strong resistance to teach management as an abstracted 




























































































well as the weak consideration of the effects produced by increasing 
internationalization of management education, were among the factors which 
favored the crystallization of, a mere tactic, compromise behavior.
France: cooperation and selective appropriation
The strategic role of France in the development of management training in Europe 
was clearly perceived by American observers and particularly by Harvard’s 
professors since the early-mid Sixties, that is before Servan-Schreiber best seller. 
Harvard professors and particularly McArthur and Christensen were firmly 
convinced that what they do well at Harvard Business School was much more 
relevant and needed in Western Europe than in some of the underdeveloped parts 
of the world. The most important point of contact between HBS and Ford 
Foundation programs was related to the strengthening of international policies. 
John McArthur wrote in 1966:
“If France is unable to build and manage strong companies able to compete on their 
own in an international context, the Government is going to be called to an ever 
increasing extent to defend and support French business /../. The fundamental 
problem does not seem to be a lack of money. It is more a problem of creating a more 
general awareness of the need to do something different in this area and on a much 
more extensive scale than heretofore”.85
This kind of judgement found a positive sound among Ford Foundation officers, 
especially among those who were already involved in social sciences programs in 
Paris. Actually the first grant to INSEAD in 1967 was related to such a climate. 
Equally strong were pressures to give support to the creation of a National 
Foundation for Management training and education. Ford Foundation positive 
reaction to the creation of FNEGE was certainly a product of the perception that 
the development of an international business community should ground itself on a 
national basis through the support of governments like in France as we shall see 
or mainly of business milieu as was in Britain, with the creation in the early 
Sixties of the Savoy group,as we have seen.
In France from the point of view of MBA market development in the early and 
mid-Sixties the situation was not different, and, to some extent worse than in 
Britain. This is particularly evident in the case of INSEAD, which extensively 
developed Harvard patterns, even by reducing the two year program to a one year 
program. In the late Sixties the situation rapidly changed, as a consequence of the 
mutual interaction of different circumstances:




























































































• a high degree of consciousness of backwardness in educational strategies, 
diffused in the institutional and intellectual environment concerning social 
sciences, economics and industrial research as well as among high administration 
officials, especially in the milieu of the “Ministère de l ’Education Nationale" and 
at the DGRST;
• the emerging leading role of a new technocratic elite which considered the 
necessity of complementary training in management research as a crucial 
requirement after traditional studies within the “grandes écoles” (ENA, 
Polytechnique, ENS, HEC), especially in big companies like Pechiney, Saint 
Gobain, l’Oreal whose PDG accepted and supported the development of the 
leading role for new managerial hierarchies;
• the impulsion to introduce innovative changes; and
• finally the decision of the government (especially though M. Debré’s 
impulsion) to act as an instrument of pressure in catalysing this movement, with 
the agreement of CNPF and des Chambres de Commerce.
This lead, in the turbulences of 1968, to the Creation of the Fondation Nationale 
pour l ’Enseignement de la Gestion des Entreprises (FNEGE). It was the product 
of an “urgente mission nationale”. J.Y. Eichenberger, president of the Board 
wrote,
“Les fondateurs ont marqué l’importance nationale de l’oeuvre a entreprendre /../ afin 
que la France ait un enseignement de la gestion digne de l’avenir qu’elle veut se forger. 
/../ La France manque de professeurs de gestion/../ En prenant à pleines mains le 
problème de la formation des formateurs, elle a la certitude d’être sur la bonne voie”86.
The role of FNEGE was different from the role of the British FME. The latter 
was basically a pressure group to get the necessary resources to start new 
institutions. Whereas, FNEGE acted rather as a cultural entrepreneur, developing 
negotiations and cooperation activities with and among institutional actors, like 
representatives of French business schools (INSEAD, HEC-ISA, Dauphine, 
ESSEC and finally the IAE, which thanks to the initiative of Pierre Tabatoni, the 
creator, in the early fifties, of this institution located in different French cities, 
started a new doctoral program in “Sciences de l ’Organisation" 87), as well as
86 Bulletin intérieur d’information de la Fondation Nationale pour l’enseignement de la gestion 
des entreprises, juillet 1971.
87 The Ford Foundation supported the project with a grant of $ 300.000 for a period of four 
years, which was administered through EIASM in Brussels [FFA Reel 2304 grant n° 472354 
IAE Programme de Doctorat, CEROG (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur les 
Organisation et la Gestion Statut], It is interesting to observe that he main goal of the new 





























































































representatives of State bureaucracy and of different industrial sectors (especially 
at the level of middle enterprises.
The implementation of cooperation patterns and organisational initiatives in 
research fields was strongly favoured by the action of interstitial actors like Pierre 
Tabatoni, an adviser to the Minister of Education, who became Chairman of 
FNEGE’s Board. Tabatoni had a crucial role in developing contacts between 
FNEGE and the Ford Foundation. Actually the HE&R staff worked closely with 
the French Foundation helping to shape its general policy, for example, “assisting 
in the negotiations with a number of universities in this countries to establish 
special programs of training. In addition we have provided American consultants 
and visiting Faculty members to help French institutions to design new 
curricula”88. Pierre Tabatoni’s role was particularly relevant in establishing a 
program to set up in Paris a Center for the development of management teaching 
and research. “The objective of the center,” - stated a Ford Foundation report- 
“would be to work out the structure, sequence and content of management 
curricula that could develop within the French University.”
The program was based on cooperation activities between the Graduate school of 
Management at Vanderblit University, under the direction of Igor Ansoff and the 
University of Aix en Provence, under the direction of Tabatoni. The program 
received a grant of $150.000 and was based on cooperation not only with 
FNEGE activities but also with the teaching staff of the Université Paris- 
Dauphine, the first Ministry-sponsored business school in France, which should 
also be considered as a creation of Tabatoni’s.
The main goal of the new Centre was not to implement French operational 
research and behaviour sciences but also to strengthen their application to 
managerial problems in a systematic way. The Centre was expected to serve as 
the focal point for a variety of activities that should contribute to the French 
management education system. For example, its role was to screen and nominate 
students for graduate programs and overseas fellowships (in connection with 
FNEGE main goals) and develop a case-studies clearing house (in cooperation 
with the other French business schools).
The behaviour of the French professors and FNEGE representatives vis-à-vis their 
American partners was inspired to an attentive control of cooperation activities 
improvement. Take for example a report sent by Philip Agid to M. Robinson in 
1973 concerning the activity of the Center:




























































































“The American professors who came last year were well appreciated on the whole 
Agid observed- “meanwhile, some remarks which do not implicate their 
competence but their behaviour, were often mentioned. They do not seem sufficiently 
concerned/../ Links with the practical world are not or little mentioned. No or almost 
not discussion about the environment differences and the process of adaptation. No 
commitment. Often they exposed writings and research that were already well known 
by the public. Teaching methods were sometimes too didactic. It would be necessary to 
set small group of discussions, in order to /../ envisage the transfer at the French level. 
In conclusion of these different remarks recommendations have been made/../ that the 
outlines and the names of the professors to be invited should be prepared by competent 
French professors /..:/ instead of having contents and men not in good correlation with 
the existing preoccupation in the French environment Finally there is no necessity to 
have three American professors. Certain French and European professors who attended 




This orientation to stress French competitiveness was supported by some relevant 
changes in management studies approach. The creation of the Parisian center 
occurred at a crucial period which was characterized by the rapid development of 
strategic management approach, (whose leading scholar was Igor Ansoff). The 
diffusion of this new model implied that stronger attention be paid to the 
problems of organizational strategies in firms and companies policies, as well as 
in the building of institutions, as part of a system in which business schools, (not 
differently from firms and companies), should confront themselves not only with 
their traditional product-market environment, (the MBA market for example and 
in general the market of education), but also with government, societies, arid 
international associations. This implied also, for educational enterprises, stronger 
attention to diversification of products and to institutional development strategy. 
Managing an international outlook and leading cooperation activities became a 
relevant factor in a process of increasing competition among European schools.
The case of French institutions (INSEAD, Dauphine and FNEGE and also to 
some extent HEC) is particularly interesting from this point of view. ISA’s 89





























































































experiments of introducing MBA curricula within a rather traditional ecole de 
commerce, were not limited to the simple transplant of American models, but also 
to the adaptation of those models to strategic institutional goals. Especially in the 
case of INSEAD this behaviour was devoted to developing international 
competitiveness, not only with other schools in Europe but also vis-à-vis 
American schools. Since 1967 INSEAD had developed an articulated strategy of 
cooperation with different American Universities and business schools, not only 
with Harvard but also with Stanford90, Columbia, and North-western.
Moreover an important change in the “leadership” of the Institute, due to the 
creation of a new deanship, academic rather than merely administrative, was 
emphasized by a research conference, which included a paper on “The Evolution 
of the Multinational Company and its Implications on Management Education” by 
L. Remmers and on “Strategy and Design for a European Management School” 
and was held with OECD’s cooperation.
In should be stressed that, since the early Seventies, OECD became a crucial 
actor in science policy thanks to Alexander King’s role as Director of the Office 
for Scientific Affairs and the creation of an “ad hoc group” whose role was to 
strengthen research and cooperation strategies among governments and nations in 
different fields, including an increasing interest, as we shall see, in management 
and management education. This became particularly evident with the 1971 
conference - European Long-Range Planning Exercise through which INSEAD 
developed a competitive advantage in strengthening its relationships with 
OECD’s networks. The main subject of the 1971 conference, related to the 
processes of organization and differentiation of international institutions in 
business education’s “environment”, had a clear strategic relation with 
INSEAD’s new institutional phase. As in the case of Vanderbilt, where an 
American “agent”, Igor Ansoff, managed a process of translation of American 
patterns to the French context, in the case of INSEAD, Dean Berry, an American 
bom professional dean, with a large knowledge of Europe, as a former Fulbright 
young fellow, in the UK and, later on, as a London Business school’s professor, 
managed a process of adapting INSEAD’s structure to a “long term planning" 
strategy.
This process, virtually oriented to the implementation of research d ’abord, as a 
main pattern in Ford Foundation’s policy, was however characterized by the 
insertion of “timing patterns” which were based on the autopoietic system of the 
Institute. It consisted in transforming constraints (such as total lack of support
90 The program with Stanford included Business Policy and Top management, Financial 
Management Behavioural sciences for management but also courses which were not typical 




























































































from the University system and a limited MBA market) into opportunities (such 
as a flexible interaction with the business environment and the creation of 
educational differentiated products whose success could have effects also in the 
implementation of MBA market). Actually in the early seventies INSEAD 
particularly developed continuing education programs, including research 
activities, rather than research as a dominant goal strategically oriented to the 
creation of a graduate studies program, which was introduced only in the late 
Eighties.
Paradoxically the growth of this contrasting orientation toward the basic goals of 
American policy in Europe was one of the effects of the Ford Foundation’s 
conspicuous grant to INSEAD ($1,000,000), strongly recommended by leading 
personalities in the board of trustees of the Foundation, who were very closed to 
the social environment of INSEAD, like Georges Frederic Doriot andespecially 
John Loudon who was a Trustee of the American Foundation. The Ford 
Foundation’s grant which followed the long term planning designed by the new 
dean of the Institute, Dean Berry, in 1971, allowed the stabilisation of INSEAD's 
faculty. It also stimulated, as a consequence of its financial constraints (which 
was based on a system of matching, by imposing for $1 of American support the 
capacity of the Institute to find an autonomous financing of $1,50) the necessity 
of developing larger and permanent contacts with the entrepreneurial environment 
and first of all the impulsion to organize a structure of fund raising progressively 
integrated with research and development strategies.
This new impulsion led to the creation of CEDEP, a structure of continuing 
education which is conceived according to "Club patterns”. Each enterprise 
which participates to CEDEP's programs should subscribe to its programs for 
almost five years, while developing a progressive re-integration of the managers 
who followed these programs inside the different sectors of the firm. Moreover, 
the new CEDEP subscribers, in order to become partners, should have the 
agreement of the other members.
CEDEP was only an element of the process of institutional differentiation of the 
Fontainebleau's institute which progressively implied a change of its size. The 
stabilization of INSEAD's faculty allowed, in fact, a more differentiated and 
articulated version of the Institute's programs. MBA programs were 
complemented not only by continuing education programs, but also by a rapidly 
expanding "executive program" which was crucial in developing a productive 
relationship with the entrepreneurial environment. One should note that in the 
early seventies this orientation was prevalent also in Belgium, particularly through 
the Deurinck-Revans project whose goal was to develop an Inter-University 




























































































models was not the best path to improve management training and performances 
was shared also by the new Management Institute in Sweden.
In the long term, the strengthening of links with the entrepreneurial milieu became 
not only a good opportunity but also a challenge in reverse. Indeed, what seems 
to differentiate INSEAD's development from the evolution of American schools 
in the last decades is more the capacity of the Fontainebleau’s institute of 
"internalizing" a complex environment. This is related to different social systems, 
rather than its growth as an academic institution with its own program of Ph.D. 
studies which, actually, is only a recent acquisition of the Institute. The growth of 
INSEAD’s academic excellence seems to be the product rather than the cause of 
its institutional growth which has primarily implied a strategic commitment in 
simultaneously strengthening, through a shared trans-national focus, its different 
sectors (MBA, executive programs, continuing education, academic research, 
fund raising).
The most relevant effect of this strategic orientation is the consolidation of an 
institutional dynamic which could be described through Alfred Chandler’s 
theoretical terms: INSEAD developed its structure following the variations of a 
strategic design whose steps and stages were related to the Institute's progressive 
changes of “size”. The non calculated effect of this rational choice was the 
growth of a synergetic interface between INSEAD's two aims, that of an 
academic institution and an enterprise capable to stimulate and even create its 
own markets.
The external factors are also relevant, particularly the fact that the crucial shift of 
INSEAD from a training institute to an educational structure occurred in the mid­
seventies, when not only the international, economic and financial context 
changed in a dramatic way, but also the system of European-American 
relationships met a crucial turning point. Paradoxically 1973, which was declared 
by Henry Kissinger the European year, was also the main entrance to a critical 
period. On this subject, a key actor (the American ambassador at the European 
Communities, Robert Schaetzel) affirmed:
“Dans la période antérieure, l'accent dans les relations américano-européennes était sur 
la co-opération, la tension était présente mais manifestement au second plan. En 1970, 
cet accent était renversé désormais".
As a matter of fact, many elements, such as changing priorities in American 
foreign policy, loss of legitimacy of US global hegemony, as a consequence of 




























































































converged to create a troublesome period in the European-American 
relationships.
Incidentally, (from this point of view which is not however the unique relevant 
factor of implementation of new European behaviour vis-à-vis American policy, 
as I have tried to show previously) it is not surprising to observe that the 
relationships between the Ford Foundation and its Western European partners 
were increasingly inspired to competitive - cooperation patterns rather than to 
imitation and transfer of models.
Of course the way in which International institutions developed was not always 
the same. Take for example the case of CEI in Geneva which, actually, was the 
most active International management institution in the European continent to 
cooperate in supporting Ford Foundation programs in Eastern European 
countries’ management training.
“The CEI Director, Bobdan Hawrylyshyn, who is a Canadian bom in Ukraine, gave 
special emphasis in contacts with socialist countries /../ Indeed CEI is the only Western 
institution that regularly has in its program executives from the Soviet Union”.
Therefore it is not surprising that the Centre d’Etudes Industrielles of Geneva was 
considered by the American officers as “the most broadly and deeply 
international” among the other European business schools.
Networks Approach versus Centralized Institutions: from the Killian 
Project to the International Institute for Management of Technology
Internationalization processes became a fundamental issue in negotiation 
strategies related to scientific policy and the resistance to the creation of 
centralized institutions under American control, in the European territory, was a 
most relevant factor in producing competitive-cooperation, behaviour and 
strategy. We have mentioned INSEAD’s resistance to the creation of a European 
Harvard Business School at Mont Pelerin. Actually it was just one of several 
phenomena of resistance to the creation of centralized institutions led by 
Americans which characterized the European scene since the early Sixties, 
especially in the French case.
The history of the Killian project, which to some extent prepared the background 
for the debate on the “technological gap” is very illuminating. In October 1960, 
James Killian, advisor to the then US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower and 
President of M.I.T. wrote the following to L. Neel, Head of the Laboratoire d 




























































































“Vous vous souvenez que le Comité scientifique au cours de mon examen du rapport 
sur l’amélioration de l’efficacité de la science occidentale à sa dernière réunion a 
approuvé deux propositions Les deux propositions étaient relatives à l’installation de 
groupes d’études chargés d’étudier respectivement la création éventuelle d’un institut 
de la science et de la technologie et d’un autre institut de soutien à la science. En 
conséquence je crois nécessaire de solliciter votre aide pour obtenir des informations 
sur les conditions particulières à votre pays./../ Comme première approche dans notre 
examen plus approfondi /../ J’attacherais un gand prix à votre réponse au questionnaire 
joint à l’annexe de cette lettre”91
The questionnaire, actually a very punctual inquiry on the technical and social 
condition of scientific production and policies, was the first step towards a larger 
project of creating a European M.I.T.
The report of the Killian working group presented in a NATO document (CM - 
61-85) led to the proposal that “a fully centralized Institute be created in the form 
of a post- graduate University embracing some five centers or divisions covering 
various fields of science and technology defined in very broad terms.”92 
The project was discussed intensively during the following two years (a very 
delicate period in the history of European integration as well as in European- 
American relations) and generated strong resistance, at both political and 
diplomatic levels, particularly in the French Ministry of Defence's high quarters. 
This resistance was at the origins of a British alternative project which tried to 
realize a compromise between American and French positions.
“In a number of quarters doubts have been expressed whether the proposal in its 
present form does in fact represent the best solution in view of the present conditions 
and long-term needs of Western Europe.”-
it was declared in a common report of July 1962-
“Europe has a large number of great national institutions - universities, technical 
universities and colleges - each reflecting in some measure the social and cultural 
background of its own country. /../ The difficulty of adapting existing long-established 
institutions to fit new patterns of scientific education is great and /../ the achievement of 
such adaptation, without added stimulus, might take a longer time than the Western
91 J. Killian, Letter to L. N eel, October 27, 1960 French National Archives(Mission des 
Archives Nationales auprès du Ministère de la Recherche) 92548 art. 20. For details on the 
questionnaire see 77321 art. 320: 1960-61 and Neel responses.
92 Affaire Project Killian. Institut International de Science et Technologie. An alternative 
proposal arising from a meeting between United States, French and British representatives on 
July 16th and 17th 1962. (Mission des Archives Nationales auprès du Ministère de la 




























































































world can afford. But it could equally be argued that such a change might be more 
rapidly attained by producing a number of centers spread over the Western countries 
and associated with existing institutions, where new principles were being applied and 
that the creation of a single international institution of the size proposed, located of 
necessity in one country alone might fail to exercise any significant effect on the overall 
patterns of scientific education, although it might well be of substantial advantage to 
the country in which it was located Such considerations as these would suggest that 
an international institute which was not centralized but which consisted of a group of 
dispersed centers each associated by its location with an existing institution would be 
more appropriated to our needs This arrangements would permit at a later date, if it 
were considered desirable, the addition of new centers of expansion of existing ones 
according to new needs as they arose. All centers would be under the control of the 
Institute which would give a doctorate degree having international recognition /../ The 
institute should be established by convention (or treaty) between the founding 
governments. This convention would set up a council of governmental representatives 
which would control the size and general character and cost of the institute /../. The 
location of headquarters and of the centers would require governmental approval, but 
should be determined primarily on grounds of scientific technological and educational 
advantages on the advice of a special body of mainly scientific composition set up to 
assess the alternative possibilities.”93.
This report was followed by “comments” from different national perspectives. 
While the Americans confirmed their initial position in favour of a centralized 
institution , the French mission represented by M. Poignant (maitre de requêtes au 
Conseil d’Etat) et M François Charles-Roux (Directeur adjoint des Affaires 
Culturels et Techniques) clearly declared their opposition to the creation of this 
institution within NATO94. This position was officially supported by M. Couve de 
Murville during the Atlantic Council Meeting in Athens and was also shared in 
the official milieu of research and University policy at the point that Professor 
Goetz member of the DGRST, declared that in the Killan project “c ’est la notion 
de domination qui apparaît et non celle de compétition ou de concurrence.”95 
The French position was rather paradoxical if one considers that the Killian 
project had originated from the recommendations of the Groupe d ’Etude Louis 
Armand, (Former EURATOM President) sur les Moyens propres à renforcer le 
potentiel scientifique du monde occidental. Created, in 1957, with the support of 
the Ford Foundation and NATO’s Scientific Committee, The Groupe Armand 
was composed of outstanding personalities from Germany, Belgium, Britain, Italy 
and the US and that the project itself had been studied and obtained the 
agreement of leading figures in French science policy like A. Piganiol, Delegué
93 Ivi pp. 3-4.
94 Ministère des Affaires étrangères 29 juin 1962, Instructions pour la mission française 
(Mission des Archives Nationales auprès du Ministère de la Recherche) 920548 art. 20.




























































































général à la recherche scientifique et technique. (DGRST). It should be said that 
at the DGRST opinions on the project were rather divergent.
But certainly the Foreign office and Army’s head quarters were the most hostile. 
On the French side the dominant suspicion was based on the idea that,
“l’énorme avance américaine en matière de découvertes technologiques ne peut 
masquer le fait que la presque totalité des découvertes fondamentales sont l’oeuvre de 
chercheurs européens /../ d’où le désir de conserver par le moyen d’un institut 
international une tête de pont européenne permettant de n’être pas coupé des travaux 
européens en matière de recherche fondamentale”96.
At the same time, however, the French officials advanced a general, but rather 
ambivalent, support to the British counter-proposal, which however remained 
very unclear in what concerned American participation and financial support to 
the “new” version of the Killian project. Actually this was considered a crucial 
point from the French point of view. But this was not the only element of 
resistance. Actually, since October 1961 French officials had expressed their 
strong critiques to the entire project, as stated in a report sent by the Chef d’Etat - 
Major Général de la Defense Nationale to the French Foreign Office, and to the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic affairs.
“D faut regretter que contrairement au mandat qu’il avait reçu, le groupe de travail 
Killian n’ait pas su procéder à un véritable inventaire des domaines d’activités 
éventuelles de l’Institut, son rapport apparaissant sur ce point plus affirmatif que 
convaincant. Il faut le regretter d’autant plus qu’au débat permanent entre les impératifs 
de la coopération et les objectifs nationaux, il n’est d’issue possible /../ que dans un 
examen conduit secteur par secteur, avec un minimum de rigueur et permettant au 
moins à chacun de se déterminer sur un bilan de ce que, dans une mise en commun des 
efforts sur le plan de l’alliance il apportera et de ce qu’il retirerera”97.
The French position, which was clearly opposed to the idea of helping NATO in 
collecting information on European developments in applied research and 
technology, was much more favourable to OECD policy.
OECD’s aim was principally to strengthen internationalisation of existing 
institutions and to develop cooperation among scholars, eventually through the 
support of a Fondation Nationale des Sciences,
96 Secret-confidentiel, Etat-Major Général de la défense nationale. Rapport 31 octobre 1961 
(Mission des Archives Nationales auprès du Ministère de la Recherche) 920548 art. 20: 1961- 
63 and 810401 art. 60: 1961 (Projet d’Etat-Major de la défense nationale, projet Killian) p.
U.




























































































“qui pourrait rappeler le National Science Foundation. I..I A la différence de ce qui 
s’est fait dans le cadre de l'OTAN,” -the report of October 1961 stated- “où les 
répresentants nationaux n’ont été associés que tardivement au projet, un répresentant 
français a été associé dès leur origine à toutes les études de projets européeens faites 
soit dans le cadre de l’OECD soit au sein des communautés”.
It should be recalled that the project of an international Institute and the idea of 
creating a Science Foundation was not considered as an opposite program in the 
first Armand group’s report.
Despite some favourable voices especially at the level of the Comité Consultatif 
de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique, where one of the delegates affirmed 
that
“le principal avantage de l’International Institute est de réaliser une disconinuité danns 
l’évolution très lente de nos sructures /étant/ un très utile instrument de décloisonement 
scientifique en Europe occidentale”58.
Thus under the increasing pressure of the French opposition the Killian project 
was abandoned. It left however some relevant traces, which are evident in two 
other different projects. The first one led, after long negotiations to the creation of 
the first “noyau” of the European Science Foundation " ,  as most of the French 
officials expected. The second one, five years after Killian Institute’s withdrawal, 
originated from an OECD proposal, in which also the Ford Foundation was 
involved. The Killian project left another relevant legacy that I shall explore in 
some detail, analyzing the origins of cooperation strategies among European 
business schools in the late sixties and early seventies. This legacy is principally 
related to the diffusion of recurrent behaviour among French social actors, (which 
became independent from gaullist ideology) and also among European leading 
personalities in research and science policy-making) in refusing to give support to 
the creation of centralized international institution.
This behaviour was particularly evident when the creation of an International 
Institute for Computing Technology and Research was proposed with NATO 
support. The main reason to vote against this proposal was(as it was declared by 
the official at the DGRST who found, with few exceptions, the support of the *9
58 R. Latarjet, Remarques sur la création d ’un institut international (projet Killian), (Mission 
des Archives Nationales auprès du Ministère de la Recherche, 81/401, carton 54/liasse 125, n. 
123 Comité Consultatif de la Recherche Scientifique et technique) 126/CC2/D.117 Annexe 
du compte rendu de la réunion du le décembre 1961.
99 The effects of the Killian project, from this point of view, have been analysed by G. Darmon, 





























































































French Army’s head quarters) the strong concurrence of the new center vis-à-vis 
the International Center of Computing created by the UNESCO in Rome.100
However in the case of the OECD’s project in 1969, of creating, an International 
Institute for Management of Technology, “à l’image du Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology”, other factors intervened to produce the failure of an institution 
which remains one of the few attempts to centralize European management 
education. IIMT’s project had its origins in the crucial phase of the debate on the, 
real or imagined, technological and managerial gap.
“The motivation for the Institute,”- Peter de Janosi wrote- “came from /../ the resulting 
fears of the Europeans that IBM would ultimately take-over the world.”
This was also the period of acceleration in the process of internationalization of 
European Business Schools. Then it is not surprising that among the members of 
the Commission which wrote the preliminary reports101 on the project there was 
one of the pioneers of INSEAD, Olivier Giscard d’Estaing. (The other “pioneers” 
were Alexander King from OECD and E. Pestel of the University of Hannover 
who later on became the vice chairman of the governing board of the Institute).
The design of the new institute, which entered into its operational phase in 1972 
directed by a German scientist M. Seetzin, was produced by a young British 
freelance consultant of the Scientific Affairs Directorate at the OECD, J. A. 
Cade.
The basic idea was to create,
“un organe international financé par l’industrie, [principally IBM Europe, British 
Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell Groups], et les gouvernements d’un certain nombre 
de pays qui aura pour but de contribuer à améliorer la gestion des systèmes 
technologiques hautement complexes par le biais de ses programmes de formation et de 
recherche /../. L’accord intergouvemamental portant à la création de l’institut sera 
ouvert à tous les pays Membres de l’OCDE ainsi qu’à d’autres pays sur invitation. Les 
sociétés et organismes qui s’engagent à verser au minimum une somme équivalente à 
$10,000 dollars par an pendant trois ans pourront devenir membres de l’assemblée 
générale” 102.
100 French National Archives, Fontainebleau, Section Contemporaine 810244 art. 197: 1969-71 
and Mission des Archives Nationales auprès du Ministère de la Recherche: 121 art 6, Projet 
de création d’un Institut informatique international 1967-70.
101 Ecarts technologiques entre pays membres, Paris, OCDE 1968, Rapport de la Commisson 
d ’étude sur la création d'un Institut Européen de la science et de la Technologie, par O. 
Giscard d’Estaing, E. Pestel and A. King, Paris, Hanover, 1968.
102 J.A. Cade, Un centre d ’excellence pour le perfectionnement de la gestion: L ’institut 




























































































The strategic impact of this institution, as intended by its promoters (particularly 
Alexander King) was to try to correct the excessive autonomisation of 
“management thought” and educational abstract patterns by developing neglected 
factors such as product innovation and engineering in order to re integrate the 
original link between productive expertise and management. The “core network" 
of IIMT, basically formed by German and British scholars, was supposed to 
strengthen this orientation, and to stimulate an interactive mutual fertilization 
between business administration and industrial engineering by developing pattern 
which were more similar to German and to some extent also to British 
tradition103.
Despite the prestigious “affiche” of the Institute, (“A sizeable faculty was 
appointed as well as various support staff. All together about 50 people were 
assembled, some with relatively long term contracts and the Institute was started 
with much fanfare”104) definition of its goals- and effective performances in terms 
of training and research- remained very flue. The Ford Foundation however 
supported the institution, in 1973, with a relatively small grant $100,000. An 
investment which, a few years later emerged as a complete disaster. In 1978 
IIMT no longer existed, and according to Ford Foundation’s officer De Janosi 
“the closing down of an intergovernmental research and training institute, not for 
reasons of war, pestilence or other calamity,' is a unique event and well worth the 
attention of a sensitive historian”.
At the beginning however this grant had generated moderate enthusiasm. It was 
part of the last grants for the European program and was approved with other 
prestigious programs: a grant of $250,000 to the International Institute of 
Management in Berlin and a grant of $3000,000 for the European Doctoral 
Fellowship Program in Management Education. Its establishment in Milan, the 
location, in the 16th century, of the “Convento delle Stelline” (renovated by the 
City of Milan), was probably a factor which favoured that enthusiasm, at least in 
the initial phase, considering that this area of Italy could be a very dynamic one. 
Since the beginning of the project however, Ford Foundation’s officers had the 
clear impression that IIMT would be essentially a middle-management school and 
could not develop first rate research. One should remember that in the (very 
early) seventies there was some perception that a new Italian renaissance in 
educational strategies and especially in management education could develop. 
Since the mid-Sixties the Ford Foundation had made conspicuous grants to the
103 Interview of the Author with Alexander King, London June 9, 1996.
104 Peter E. de Janosi, Visit to International Institue for the Management o f Technology, 




























































































Olivetti Foundation to develop graduate studies and research in social sciences 
and economics, and an Italian program for the Development of Management 
Education was envisaged, under the leadership of the “Agnelli Foundation” which 
since its creation in 1967, has also been very active in stimulating conferences 
and studies on the “technological gap”.
Expectations of a leading role to be played by the Agnelli Foundation- especially 
through the initiative taken by its director Ubaldo Scassellati- were particularly 
high in 1971. In a Memorandum of March 1971 Marshall Robinson wrote,
“The Agnelli undertaking is based in part on a pending agreement with an organized 
confederation of about 80,000 Italian enterprises and calls for approximately 
$1,000,000 to be raised and put a disposal of the Agnelli Foundation for building up a 
cadre of teachers and developing management education institutions. The decision have 
been taken in principle and presumably in the next month or so the final steps will be 
made that will release this $1,000,000 to the Agnelli Foundation. Simultaneously, the 
Agnelli people have begun to pull together the existing training and business schools 
and have caused them to start talking one another”105.
Perhaps Marshall Robinson, had good reasons to be so optimistic but in the next 
month however several facts demolished his hopes. The Agnelli Foundation 
launched the “Valletta project” which, according to the documents I have 
collected and several interviews with the participants, was a very unclear and 
ambiguous project. The project was related more to the necessity to control a new 
generation of sociologists, psychologists and social experts in order to limit the 
development of an intelligentsia supporting political extremism and social protest 
within the industrial framework. Moreover the support given by the Foundation to 
association strategies of Italian Business Schools was limited to a grant of Italian 
Lire 750.000 (more or less $300) and a secretarial service. The project with the 
Confindustria proved to be as relevant as promised. Actually, it generated a 
positive experiment of the insertion of young graduate students (who later on 
became full professors in Italian University) within the European Institute for 
Advanced Management Studies. This experiment was however of short duration. 
In what concerns the director of the Fondazione, Scassellati, one should recall 
that he was the main character (or the “victim”?) of a big political scandal in 
which he was accused of having prepared a rightist “push”. As an immediate 
consequence he was removed from his place at the Agnelli Foundation, resulting 
in the abandonment of the original project, which was to a become a Foundation 
in the American style.
105 Marshall Robinson memorandum International Institute for the Management of Technology 




























































































This narrative report of Italian events leads to more general considerations. I 
would argue that the creation of a centralized institution was probably easier in a 
peripheral country like Italy than in other countries like Germany and England. 
The rather unstructured patterns of Italian management could create a positive 
support, (in terms of “backwardness possible advantages”) but there was also the 
danger of the “enclosure” effect which was not new in Italy. For an institution 
like IIMT it determined probably a total impossibility to “oxygenate”. It should 
be added that considering the Italian structural environment and in particular the 
failure in reforming faculties of engineering by introducing training courses in 
industrial engineering, it was rather euphemistic to expect, a rapid and intensive 
development of research in applied technology, starting from an “Italian 
location”. Innovation in the early seventies came, mostly, from the role played by 
the IPSOA’ Diaspora in creating new institutions- including ASFOR (which is a 
good illustration of the epsilon effect I have described above) and by a new 
generation of scholars trained through the ITP programs, as stated before.
The Origins of European Business Schools’ Networks
Considering the reasons which produced the failure in the experiments I have 
described above, European reactions against the idea of creating a centralized 
institution to manage doctoral programs does not appear to have been an 
exception. Before developing a detailed analysis of the stream of actions which 
led to the creation of the first European Business School Network, as a possible 
reply to American pressure to start a centralized institution, some methodological 
considerations should be developed.
The first element which characterizes network systems is their orientation to 
transform themselves into meta-organisations, implying the interaction of more 
than one institutional actor. A second relevant factor is the emergence of a 
dynamism created by internal contradictions related both to social actors' strategic 
goals and to the interplaying of different institutional models within a focal 
organization. One should then consider that:
a) Social actors who participate to the network's dynamics, develop strategic 
behaviours, whose main goal is to obtain the best advantages within the network 
itself, competing with other social actors who share the same aim. In such a 
process they can not only act according to their own institutional patterns by 
attempting to merely reproduce them. Instead they may have to adapt their own 
taken-for-granted structural assumption to a rather undetermined and very 




























































































b) Social actors try to become indispensable, that is to occupy a position which 
implies constraints not only to other participants but also to the actors themselves. 
They can react to this static situation by creating new external interactions and 
new circulation strategies or, on the contrary, by strengthening their position 
within the network, fostering its hierarchical structure and rational procedures to 
the detriment of its dynamism and of strategic flexibility. Of course one can 
perceive a lot of intermediate social behaviours which are the product of the 
interplaying of multiple non intentional factors.
The focal level of the analysis is then the study of an unstable equilibrium among 
different institutional, functional and social poles, characterized by a high level of 
heterogeneity and by asymmetrical positions within the network and its 
environment.
In the case of European business schools' associations this environment is 
particularly complex because it implies educational institutions as well as the 
entrepreneurial milieu and their respective "markets"- as suggested by Herbert 
Simon. Network dynamics demand in this case an intensive work of translation 
and continuing presence of interstitial actors who are able to control different 
sectors of social competence as well as to organise different "local", "national" or 
"institutional" strategies. "En réalité la description d'un réseau passe par celle de 
la circulation/transformation (capitalisation des intermédiaires)" (Callon 1989). 
This implies that one institution could control more than one network or that one 
network could produce the colonisation of other networks (network of networks). 
In the case of the first European business schools' associations, for example, the 
interplay among different networks was largely qualified by the role of the Ford 
Foundation in financing and orienting their activity.
"L'allocation des ressources financières est un des éléments essentiels de la mise en 
forme et de la consolidation des réseaux. /../. Le financier ne se contente plus d'évaluer 
des rentabilités incertaines /../. Il se met en position de créer des synérgies, de faire des 
propositions, d'associer des entreprises" (Callon, 1991).
In order to understand the origins and development of European Business School 
networks one should firstly consider the competitive advantage that Belgium 
acquired through the stream of actions produced by a leading figure in European 
management educational development, Gaston Deurinck, the founder of the 
Belgian Productivity Centre and of the Fondation Industrie Université.
Unlike other European Centers which were still rather isolated, the Belgian 
Productivity Center was characterized, since the Fifties, (as we have seen in the 




























































































efforts to improve the quality of management. Instead of considering management 
education as a peculiar subject of a totally new kind of institution, separated from 
the University system, as happened for example in Italy, Deurinck insisted in 
developing a strategy of legitimization of management education inside and with 
the cooperation of the main Universities in the country.
The anticipatory behaviour in Deurinck’s strategy was to develop this 
organizational activity into an international context. This orientation gave to the 
Belgian Productivity Center a competitive advantage in organizing European 
cooperation strategies.
Deurinck was perfectly aware of this role: "Belgium" - he wrote - "could be 
considered as a European pilot-case in this field and indeed the Ford Foundation 
grant was made on the understanding, institutionalized through the meeting of the 
heads of productivity centres within the E.P.A., that the experiences gained by the 
Belgians should be shared with their European colleagues”. Deurinck attempted 
firstly to diffuse this behaviour to institutions with the same characteristics of the 
Belgian centers, through the European Productivity Agency programs. "Such 
contacts," - according to Deurinck - "proved useful but insufficient, both because 
of the heterogeneity of the participants and the infrequency of the meetings. A 
need was felt for closer cooperation with the best institutes of business 
administration in other European countries. This need was met with the 
establishment, on the initiative of the Fondation Industrie-Université of the 
European Association o f Management Training Centers, in 1959".
Representative Cooperation: the origins of EAMTC (European Association 
of Management Training Centers)
This initiative coincided with the beginning of a new phase in European 
management education development, which lasted until the mid-sixties. This 
phase was characterized on the one hand, by a process of differentiation in 
typology and size among European institutes and training centers, and on the 
other by a strong impulsion to gain a better understanding of cultural similarities 
and differences. This understanding implied the development of a double path 
where the dominant orientation to standardize European institutional patterns and 
educational strategies imitating American models, was progressively counter­
balanced by a process of hybridization of patterns and strategies according to 
national and local cultural traditions and social context.
However, this process of differentiation concerned the international networks 
only to a lower extent. It is true that especially after the dissolution of EPA, a 




























































































was actually one of the EAMTC’s aims. Nevertheless, during the early sixties, 
the European networks grew in membership number, but they still remained 
undifferentiated in their qualitative patterns. EAMTC’s s membership was largely 
heterogeneous. It included in fact European business schools of different size, 
created outside the national university system, such as the new bom INSEAD in 
France, IESE in Spain and ISIDA in Italy, as well as schools and centers which 
were part of an already established University, such as Manchester University in 
England, the Université Catholique de Louvain and the Instituts d'Administration 
des Entreprises which depended upon French Universities. The basic function of 
EAMTC. was to share information among different training centers and to 
legitimise their existence vis-à-vis other older academic institutions than to co­
operate in creating an institutional design or in elaborating an educational 
strategy. EAMTC was more similar to a rather informal sociability area than to a 
Research and Development network.
Moreover the new association risked duplication of the role and activities of an 
already existing network, the International University Contact for Management 
Education, created in Rotterdam in 1952. The main difference between IUC and 
EAMTC was that the former grouped mainly but not exclusively, individual 
management teachers on a university level and the latter grouped institutions.
Their goals were, however, similar. They were mostly related to the diffusion of 
information concerning teaching and training strategies, and to developing 
contacts with the entrepreneurial milieu and to strengthening organisational 
management of the member institutions. The main risk for both institutions was 
that they had a real representativity but not yet a sufficient selectivity. This 
situation implied also a reduction of networks' dynamism in terms of limiting 
concurrence among centres by mean of association strategies, (this effect has 
been described by François Bourricaud as "institutional lethargy"). As a result, 
the increasing involvement of the Ford Foundation in European management 
education became crucial.
As we have already seen, Ford Foundation intervention in the European scene 
progressively complicated the picture of cooperation strategies introducing new 
elements of competition among institutions and inside their networks. 
Competition became particularly strong among international schools and 
international networks in promoting a European common doctrine and style in 
training for business management, which was already - as we have seen- a shared 
goal among the leading individuals and institutions in the pioneer phase of 
European management education, in the early Fifties. Competition among social 
and institutional actors (schools and networks or even schools within the same 




























































































"continents" (Europe and the United States) as an unexpected effect of the "equal 
partnership" strategy, promoted in the Kennedy era became the Janus-faced issue 
(actually a true oxymoron) of cooperation strategies.
Is it possible, however, to isolate a phase of "pure" cooperation which preceded 
the systematic intervention of the Ford Foundation in the field of European 
management education?. It is a matter of fact that even in the pioneer phase, the 
strict collaboration between the European Productivity Agency and EAMTC, 
directed by Gaston Deurinck, was the product of an articulated agreement in 
order to avoid or at least to limit competition, rather than the effect of a 
"spontaneous" cooperation attitude. It is however equally evident that in the 
phase that preceded Ford Foundation's involvement in Europe, the dominant 
orientation was- as we said- to limit or at least, to control competitive strategies 
by quantitatively extending networks and by promoting inter-networks 
cooperation.
One should argue that in the pioneer phase, the development of a Janus-fronted 
competitive-cooperation was a latent pattern in networks functioning and that it 
became a visible pattern in the following phases when competitive cooperation 
became a “normal” pattern in developing associative strategies, as a consequence 
of the increasing internationalization of management education in a "world-wide 
campus”. From this point of view it is possible to describe three historical phases. 
The first one is dominated by legitimization strategies, through association at 
national level, whose aim was standardizing management education in conformity 
with University patterns.
The second phase, which started significantly after the treaty of Rome, with the 
creation of EAMTC in 1959, is characterized by an "anticipatory" strategy based 
on Europeanization of management education, through international association 
strategies, whose aim is, again, standardization of management training patterns. 
As it was recently pointed out "standardization of training appears to guarantee 
this privilege to all the certified knowers; but it is, in fact, only the homogeneous 
background upon which the lines that stratify and create hierarchies among 
special 'communities' of discourse can be drawn. A form of inequality 
characterizes all cognitive specialized fields. The main trend in the third period 
which started in the mid-sixties and lasted until the mid-Seventies was a process 
of differentiation whose result was precisely professionalization of management 
education, by means of introducing a system of institutional and organizational 
asymmetries. This phase is characterized by the leading role of the Ford 
Foundation and by the increasing internationalization and academicization of 
management education, which created its "core region" by introducing research as 




























































































competitive-cooperation among the "core" centers. This process of differentiation 
of management education's "core" from its peripheral regions, represented by 
those who teaches apprentices and, in a further removed concentric circle, by 
those who disseminate knowledge and make the profession visible in the press, 
was strengthened by the renewal of interest of the OECD in management 
education strategies.
Network development also had a crucial role in this process of differentiation. For 
each of the above mentioned phases one can detect a typical figure and a peculiar 
size of competitive cooperation, changing patterns especially in the transition 
between association strategies, still rather informal, and the creation of structured 
and complex networks.
The role of EAMTC was crucial in this transitional phase. In December 1958, the 
Fondation Industrie-Université pour le Perfectionnement des Dirigeants d ’ 
Entreprises invited the directors of a few management training centers to Knokke 
for a preliminary discussion. They agreed on the necessity of establishing a 
European Association of Management Training Centers aiming at the promotion 
of a high scientific standard of business education and closer cooperation in the 
fields of research and teaching. Reference was made especially to the activity of 
the "American Association of Collegiate Business Schools". Following the 
meeting at Knokke, the EAMTC. was constituted in January 17th, 1959, in 
conformity with the Belgian International non-profit making Agencies Act of 
October 1919. In July 1959 an agreement in eight points was signed by the 
European Productivity Agency directors and the new president of the EAMTC, 
Gaston Deurinck.
Deurinck planned to center cooperation with EPA on three main points:
a) advisory role of the Association with the European Productivity Agency for the 
elaboration of EPA projects in the sphere of management education. In 
Deurinck's opinion EPA was "too slow and too heavy to handle this kind of job" 
and needed the help of an "ad hoc" association;
b) systematic use by the affiliated members of the association of the various 
opportunities offered by EPA; and
c) active participation of the Association in some EPA research projects.
Deurinck's attempt to develop EAMTC's action as a kind of network of networks, 
which was initially facilitated by the substantial failure on similar initiatives like 
Eurogestion (created in 1957 by IPSOA with the cooperation of the Parisian 




























































































a) the creation of an High Patronage Committee which brought in contact the 
leading personalities in the European entrepreneurial milieu and later on permitted 
them to realize a coordinated action in promoting the development of the 
educational institutions which seemed to fulfil the needs of large enterprises and 
European multinationals. Paradoxically the benefit of these contacts went to the 
business schools which developed an international out-look rather than to 
EAMTC itself.
b) the financial and organizational intervention of the Ford Foundation in 
EAMTC development (with a grant of $ 75,000), which, despite the initial 
opposition of some of the Foundation's officers, was nevertheless crucial in 
launching the "grand design" of the Ford Foundation's European and International 
strategies in management education.
These strategies were based on an articulated strategy of selection and 
differentiated kinds of intervention which, paradoxically, limited the leading role 
of networks in cooperation strategies.
c) the creation in 1961 of a European Liaison Committee under EPA's patronage, 
whose aim was to foster cooperation between officials in carrying out certain 
tasks of common interested and to avoid, so far as possible, operational activities 
overlapping. Its members were: EPA, EAMTC., the European Committee of the 
International Committee of Scientific Management, (CECIOS) and the 
International University Contact (IUC). These bodies cooperated in publishing 
the journal "Management International"
The creation of the Liaison Committee is a symptomatic effect of the perception 
by key actors, like Deurinck, that something was rapidly changing in the leading 
position of association networks in controlling and organizing international 
management strategies. Plus that a new strategy for the better structuring of the 
existing network was perhaps necessary. Memoranda of the Ford Foundation's 
officers clearly reveal that Deurinck worried about the possible concurrence of 
the new European Institute created in Fontainebleau. "Deurinck is sceptical" - 
Waldemar Nielsen observed in June 1959- "regarding the Paris Chamber of 
Commerce International Business schools. He said they have started with the 
building and with a lot of resources rather than good men (Deurinck was not 
aware of the progress made in Paris in getting good faculty members)" .
Two years later, in October 1961, another officer, Stanley Gordon reported that 
"Deurinck expresses his feeling that the d’Estaing /Olivier /center, despite its 
European name, is not doing work at a level comparable with the better centers at 




























































































not the best. Deurinck apparently feels that it would have been an excellent thing 
to establish the d'Estaing center in the middle Forties, but now that several centers 
have been established there seems to be only marginal need for it".
Further developments of INSEAD, especially in the period of the Ford 
Foundation large grant ($100,000,000) and the leading role that the Fontainebleau 
Institute had, since the early seventies, in organizing some crucial European 
networks, as we have seen in the case of the International teachers program, 
shows that Deurinck's worries were directed in the right direction!! (Gemelli 
1993).
Symptomatically these worries began to retreat when Deurinck actively 
participated in a new institutional design whose aim was to structure international 
networks by means of a strategy of the rationalization of existing associations on 
the one hand and by the systemic organization of new institutions, on the other.
Let us start with this last project, and by stressing that in both cases the role of 
the Ford Foundation was crucial and that this strategy found its basic support in 
the consolidation of a restricted and "inner" network of interstitial actors, 
dislocated in different European countries.
The Creation of the European Institute for Advanced Studies in 
Management
By the mid-Sixties there was, on both sides of the Atlantic, the conviction that 
American management methods were superior, more powerful and competitively 
damaging to European economies. This conviction was over wound by the 
political strategies implied by the "celebration" of Servan Schreiber's Defi 
Américain. Jean Jacques Solomon, Head of the Division of Science and 
Technology Policy at the OCDE, made a clear diagnosis of the political 
implications connected with the rapid transition between the "technological gap", 
which was the mot d'ordre of the early Sixties and the "management gap" which 
was celebrated in the mid-sixties and created the right context to the process of 
internationalization of professional management education.
"En quête d'une mesure de 1’ 'écart technologique' la France et l'Europe découvrirent 
progressivement que les disparités n'étaient pas là où on avait cru pouvoir les situer: ce 
qui était en jeu dans le "défi américain", ce n'était pas le génie ni même la vocation 
scientifique des Européens, mais leur aptitude à tirer parti des résultats de la 




























































































Thus management education became the core of a new gap.
"It was therefore not unnatural," -Marshall Robinson said some years later- "that 
Europeans looked to the American management system and its educational under 
pinning for hints about how to close the gap. And it was equally natural for many of 
them to come to the place in American society which had been working with American 
management schools- namely the Ford Foundation. This at the very moment that the 
Ford foundation was winding down with management education in the United States."
The Foundation’s activities that emerged were many and varied but there was, 
however, as I have stressed many times, a common and basic background: the 
strengthening of professionalization of management through research activities 
and competitive-cooperation strategies, which implied at the same time a process 
of rationalizing existent institutions and creating or developing new dynamic 
centers. One of these centers in specific was the European Institute for Advanced 
Study of Management. The Ford Foundation's grant proposal files contain a lot of 
details about the origins of El ASM.
The idea of an institution for advanced study in management with a joint US and 
European faculty emerged around 1967 as the Foundation staff "bean to size up 
the prospective flow of European students heading toward US graduate business 
programs".
Substantive and economic considerations supported the idea of a Europe—based 
institution. Compared with a program that would bring the same number of 
students to the States, an overseas institution appeared much more likely to 
establish a truly European pattern of advanced work in management studies. The 
proposed institution also looked as though it could deliver more trained people 
faster and, in the process, produce more relevant teaching materials. From the 
Foundation's stand point, it appeared also to be a less costly way to-do the job.
The creation of EIASM was the result of a very complicated experimental phase 
during which many options were discussed and confronted. The original concept 
of the Institute was outlined in a joint paper by George Shultz (the then dean of 
the university of Chicago Business School) and Jacques Dreze (Director of the 
Centre for Operations Research and Econometrics at Louvain). The paper was 
diffused among representatives of major US and European Business schools and 
discussed in a conference held in Rotterdam in 1968. The conference was 




























































































management studies in Europe and one of its results was the creation of a study 
group on the Institute project.106.
The discussions which preceded the conspicuous grant, ($1,000,000 over a four 
years period beginning July 1, 1971) as well as each report of the study group 
members, are extremely interesting in situating the position of each actor in this 
strategic context. The role of which was emphasized by the effect of the student 
revolution in many European countries and especially in France. Actually many 
social actors who were directly concerned by management education 
development and particularly Pierre Tabatoni, then advisor to the Ministry of 
Education, perceived the university system's crisis as an opportunity to develop 
new educational strategies, whose key level could be management. The university 
system's crisis was also perceived as a basic factor in stimulating the French 
entrepreneurs to change their organisational and strategic orientation especially 
towards the role of professional trained managers within the firms. This 
evaluation was, for example, the background of Salvatore Teresi's project of 
creating the CEDEP.
It is impossible to report in this paper, the large variety of interventions in the 
debate which preceded the creation of the Institute. An overview of the study 
group members comments and proposals reveals that some key actors' 
orientations were prevalent. The maîtres du jeu of the study group on the 
European side were principally Pierre Tabatoni and Gaston Deurinck. The core of 
Shultz and Dreze’s proposal was the idea of creating, with the American 
organizational and financial support, an international institute to train managers, 
teachers and researches. Tabatoni and Deurinck with the support of some other 
European business schools' directors, were able to convince all the participants to 
the study group of the need that existing European Universities should be much 
more involved.
Ten years after EIASM.'s creation, Marshall Robinson, in a conference given in 
1982 at EIASM (Reflections on a Healthy Institution) frankly recognized that the 
idea of an international institute,
"was a crazy idea that was shutdown for all the right reasons, and enabled us to spend
the rest of the time exploring other ways to deal with Europe's needs for an improved
106 The study group incuded H.J.H.van Beinum (Rotterdam); T.J. Bezemer (Rotterdam- 
Nedelandae Economische Hogeschool); G.P.E. Clarkson (Mancheser Business School); G. 
Deurinck (FIU, Brussels); J. Faus (IESE Barcelona); T. Paulsson Frenckner (Stockolm School 
of Economics); K. Holt (Norvegian Institue of Technology, Trondheim); L. Pack (Universitat 
Manhaim, Germany): J. Prins (IUC, Rotterdam); J.F. Sinclair (FME, London);P.L. Smith 




























































































system of management education What ultimately emerged was truly an institute 
for advanced study and a resource for European Universities engaged in graduate 
studies in the field of management. The mission of the institute was to conduct seminars 
on the state of the art in the US and elsewhere in the different sub-fields in management 
studies, to provide a place where management research people could examine 
alternative research strategies and have their ideas criticized by people whom they 
could respect, and finally to provide a place to which European doctoral students could 
go to find a community of scholars interested in advising and helping them with their 
research efforts"
Robinson clearly recognized also the role played by Tabatoni and Deurinck.
"Two points of importance became clear as the discussions moved forward. One was 
that Pierre Tabatoni would provide the dominant intellectual influence on the character 
of the institution /.../. And it was his analysis, reasoning and logical presentation of the 
situation that caused the institute to become primarily an instrument to foster the 
development of high quality research and teaching in the Universities /../. The second 
point of importance was that the institute would be where Gaston Deurinck wanted it 
to be./../ he never lost sight of the objective, and never lost patience with those in the 
club, and the rest of us never doubted that the institution would end up exactly as 
Gaston wanted it to be" 101
Deurinck and Tabatoni's roles are emphasized by the fact that Brussels was 
selected as the Institute's site after a long series of negotiations in which Geneva 
and Rotterdam were also selected. Previously the Foundation gave serious 
consideration to the idea of lodging the Institute at INSEAD, which was clearly 
the wrong solution from Tabatoni and Deurinck’s point of view. Tabatoni’s 
interest in having the Institute in Brussels was related to its strategic position to 
France and to his close relation with the Ford Foundation and more generally with 
outstanding American management educators and management education 
administrators. As an adviser of the French Ministry of education, as an eminent 
member of FNEGE, and as a consultant of the Ford Foundation Tabatoni was in 
the position to act as a key actor in his country and to prepare an articulated 
design to develop high-standing management research in France. It was based on 
two projects, the first one was the creation of a research structure, CEROG, as 
part of the University system, and the other project was an institutional joint- 
venture with the Vanderblit school of management, to be developed in the United 
States. Thus, by evaluating the general problem of strengthening French 
management advanced studies, Tabatoni considered EIASM as a good, 
complementary opportunity, but not as the only possibility to develop research 
and international educational strategies. In other words if EIASM was not located 
in France, there was certainly more room for other, new institutions. *




























































































Deurinck also had many reasons to have EIASM located in Brussels. It 
represented the right opportunity to articulate an inter-network strategy which 
was supported also by EAMTC-IUC merger. This merger permitted a better 
differentiation of functions among the existing networks , by strengthening their 
competitiveness in the international arena, especially vis-à-vis expanding 
institution like INSEAD. A point on which I shall return.
Thus, following their own steps and by trying to fulfil their national and 
institutional goals, Tabatoni and Deurinck met one of the crucial aims of the Ford 
Foundation's involvement in European educational strategies, to develop large- 
scale institutions as an integrated system in an international policy. It is 
interesting to note what Gaston Deurinck wrote to Marshall Robinson about the 
design of the new institution in July 1968:
"The main purpose of this memorandum is to convey the idea that a doctoral program 
must be considered as a sub-system of a more general system which should be 
composed of key institutional points of possible growth of management education in 
Europe /../ The structure of the final decision should be built on the joint venture idea 
of the growth points of management education in Europe"108.
The network-system effect was also the product of a rapid change of the 
historical and political context. Internationalism in education and especially in 
management education played, in fact, a totally new role if compared to the late 
fifties, during which association strategies among national centers were 
prevailing.
A revealing phenomenon of this shift, (which, as it was said before, was 
emphasized by the rapid transition from the technological gap to the managerial 
gap) was the creation of the OECD- sponsored centre in Milan, the International 
Institute for the Management of Technology. IIMT, as we have seen renewed, to 
some extent, the old and controversial project presented by the former MIT 
president, J. Killian, in the early Sixties.
Reflections on this crucial shift were, however, rare among the participants to the 
study group. Harvard Business School’s representative's contribution to the 
discussion on the Institute's plans (dated July 1,1968), is, along with Deurinck's 
memorandum, one of the very few documents which developed a systematic 
analysis of this new trend, among a large variety of memoranda, from various 
American and European institutions, which contains only comments on Schulze 
and Dreze's proposal. Then it deserves more attention than other reports in the 
Ford Foundation files.




























































































“I have often been asked by my colleagues here why organizations such ours should 
devote resources to the further development of management education in Europe"- 
wrote professor John H. McArthur of the HBS" -/../I feel the answer to the question is 
clear, and that support of this kind /../ can be justified on the single basis of the 
enlightened self interest of the United States. /../ This is because of my view that if 
European business cannot quickly develop the capacity to compete in strictly economic 
terms against American business enterprises in Europe, then, almost certainly, 
European business will be protected by their governments with political means. This 
outcome would greatly restrict the operations of American enterprises operating and 
trading in Western Europe. It would also influence strongly the relations and general 
political climate of the nations around the North Atlantic./../ This can already be seen in 
the slow erosion in the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and in recent weeks, the 
unilateral measures taken by France vis-à-vis the Common Market. These are not 
isolated events, but part of a developing pattern that has very deep meaning for the 
United States. A part, and indeed an important part, of this developing malaise has its 
roots in the inability of many Europeans to manage large-scale business enterprises. 
Hence the relevance and importance of business education in Western Europe"109.
The emphasis was pointed towards strengthening competitive dynamics both in 
the educational system and in the structural environment of European industries. 
McArthur revealed the paradox which could derive by a supporting action 
exclusively directed to,
"spewing elite schools in a largely non competitive national or regional environment. 
These ventures"- McArthur affirmed-"are non competitive in several senses. The people 
behind them are preoccupied with making their school the selected institution in its 
national environment. They have also sought exclusive ties with leading institutions 
whose support they need.( business and government bodies at home, the Ford 
Foundation and Harvard Business School abroad). In most such cases the goal has been 
to develop these special relationships so as to protect and further the interests of a 
particular school and not really to further the interests of a particular school and not 
really to further the interests of the system as a whole/../ The multiplier effect will be 
much greater if the likes of the Ford foundation and Harvard think and plan in terms of 
influencing the latter and not only the former"
McArthur insisted on two additional strategic elements. Firstly, faculty 
development which was the real strategic point should be strengthened by 
educational administrators. One can observe at this point, that the process of 
internationalization of management education institutions as an integrated system 
of institutions with a differentiated role, was crucial in developing this kind of 
figure, until that moment almost unknown in the European context. Moreover it 
should be stressed that the core of international networks was characterized
109 John H. McArthur, Some Thoughts on a Program for Management Education in Western 




























































































precisely by the presence of these kind of actors (Deurinck and his closest 
collaborator Roger Talpaert should be considered as the pioneers of this social 
and organizational role). It should also be observed that in order to develop 
networks' "core capabilities" which permitted the development of a strategy as a 
set of broad commitments made to define and rationalize main objectives 
Deurinck was compelled to think in terms of system. Thus it is not surprising that 
he supported two parallel and complementary projects. The creation of EIASM 
on one side and the merger between EAMTC and IUC on the other, whose kind 
of cooperation, mainly oriented to control and limit competitiveness, risked to 
reproduce the protection strategy of favoured institutions described by McArthur 
as a non systemic development pattern.
While supporting different interests, McArthur and the highly restricted group of 
European educational administrators met on another strategic goal: the idea that 
the European educational infrastructure should be considered as a structural 
support of a "system of practitioner oriented management education" which could 
act as a multiplier in developing closer contacts between business and business 
educators.
Rationalizing networks: the origins of EFMD
The rapid shift from the technological gap to the managerial gap and in particular 
the fact that it was considered as a crucial target by large scale institutions like 
OECD and the Commission of European Communities was a basic element in 
developing the project which led to the creation of EFMD. The increasing role of 
these two large-scale bodies changed progressively not the rules but certainly the 
scale of the game and acted as a multiplier of competitive cooperation strategies 
towards directions which were perhaps unexpected, especially form the point of 
view of American actors. Going back to McArthur's memorandum one should 
note that what was expected was a multiplier effect in European competitiveness 
through US. cooperation rather than competition with the US. In any case the 
scenario of management education development in the seventies was much more 
complex than its script.
At the origins of EFMD there was a proposal of the Ford Foundation, which 
developed the arguments of Gaston Deurinck's (outlined in a memorandum) to 
create an association between the already existing European networks whose goal 
was to improve management education. The first step was indeed, after long and 
complex negotiations, a merger between EAMTC and IUC, whose presidents, 




























































































April 1970. The merger leads to the creation of a European Fund for Management 
Education and Development.
The idea of a Foundation, which totally rationalized the two pre-existing 
institutions by creating a new institutional body, was a further development of its 
original project which introduced some crucial shifts. In his Address to the 
General Assembly in Amsterdam on 8th November 1971, Johannes Meijnen, 
former Dutch Minister of Defence and Chairman of AKZO, then president of 
EFMD, said that "the concept of the Foundation which we are structuring here 
today owes much to the inspiration of the Memorandum on Industrial Policy 
published last year by the Commission of the European Communities". OECD’s 
support of this idea was pointed out by Ambassador Von Platen, Chairman of the 
OECD Industry Committee six months before the EFMD General Assembly. The 
OECD celebrated the renewal of its interest in management education with a 
Symposium whose main subject "was the study of the effects of managerial gap 
as a detector of a "need for an educational system appropriate to the technical 
world".
The accent was put on three concepts, interdependence, rationalization and 
internationalization. The last concept implied the role of Europe in a large scale 
system including Eastern Europe, the United Sates as well as Japan. One of the 
main topics in Von Platen’s speech in Amsterdam was, in fact, "learn from 
Japan":
"Some may say that Japan has little or no true management education. But the proof of 
the pudding is in eating1'.- Von Platen said I believe that the Japanese have a 
remarkable talent particularly in planning, cooperation (government -industry) and 
motivation which is a key to industrial success of increasing importance. So let us not 
forget to look at lessons to be learned in Japan”.
The role of OECD, along with that of the Common market, was crucial in shaping 
the idea of a Foundation for European Management Development. In June 1970, 
when the EFMD was still an association ("Fund") of two main centres, Roger 
Talpaert (who was a key actor in European networks' story, being at the same 
time the Director of the Fund and the General secretary of E.I.A.S.M.), in a 
Memorandum to Marshall Robinson wrote:
"A first possibility is a limited rationalization of the two main international associations /../ 
under the heading of a European Association for Management Education. This has the 
advantage of corresponding completely to the initial Ford Foundation proposal, but the 
resulting body will be too limited to be able to influence whatever initiatives are taken e.g. by 
the OECD and the Common Market. /../ Perhaps the best solution might be that a grant be 
given for a specific project and not for the "Fund" as such, this specific project being the 




























































































as the definition of relevant standards, the setting up of opportunities for the professional 
development of teachers and researchers The "Fund" would then be kept open for other 
projects and could be en entrusted by the Common market authorities with preparation in 
depth for the setting up of the proposal Foundation"110.
Talpaert insisted on the fact that the new foundation should concentrate its effect 
in management development rather that on management educational strategies: 
"The Common Market authority"- he said- "insisted on a stronger representation 
of industry in the ’Fund’." This orientation was crucial in a period of rapid 
expansion of European large-scale firms which developed their own market for 
management graduated students who began to easily find a qualified job in 
Europe without being compelled to emigrate to the US.
Moreover there was also the expanding market of developing management 
education in Eastern countries, which was already an important chapter in the 
Ford Foundation grand design of creating a world wide campus in management 
education. EFMD was ready since its creation to expand its membership 
organization to those countries, confirming, with the approval of the Ford 
Foundation, its pan-European role. In his address at EFMD’s first General 
Assembly, J. Meijnen stressed "the character of the Foundation as an all 
European body"111, and extended a special welcome to the representatives 
present from Eastern Europe. If one recalls the crucial role of the Eastern 
European program in the Ford Foundation's educational policies, the new 
Foundation should be considered as a strategic channel to develop a systemic 
cooperation with the Eastern countries. Its role reveals however that cooperation 
strategies as strategic tools in internationalisation policy could also act as 
elements to strengthen the autonomization of the European networks, which could 
progressively interact without the medium of American translators and donors. 
But this is a totally new topic of the same story which should be developed in 
another chapter especially devoted to management education in Eastern Europe 
countries.
Many other events revealed that the "apprenti sorcier" began to develop a 
strategy of progressive autonomization from his American master. In 1971 an 
"informal" agreement among some leading European business schools contrasted 
successfully the idea of creating, in Switzerland, a European duplicate of Harvard 
Business School. At the same time INSEAD developed a "campaign" to create a 
European International Teachers Program, and deprived Harvard Business School 
of its traditional and centralised control on this program. The new INSEAD's
110 [FFA Reel n° 1659, Grant n° 70204, Section 3].
111 J. Meijnen, Addrress at the General Assembly in Amsterdam on 8th November 1971 [FFA 




























































































"professional" dean, Dean Berry launched also a claim for autonomizing 
European educational strategies. He also, in a paper prepared for OECD, which 
was many times quoted at the EFMD's first General Assembly, argued that the 
system of American business education was verging on obsolescence and 
irrelevance, whilst Europe offered substantial opportunities if centres could co­
operate in building a network. It is interesting to note that the press release which 
announced the creation of EFMD expressed this trend towards autonomization in 
terms of bypassing the American models: "The continued reliance on the US 
model is often inappropriate to the European context"- it was clearly said.
In the turbulent environment of the Seventies the dramatic difference in 
educational patterns, institutional design and strategic goals, which characterized 
European institutions and was initially perceived as an obstacle rapidly became a 
system of opportunities to be exploited in a competitive way:
The variety of situations within Europe"-Talpaert wrote in a reports dated March 6, 
1970- "can be exploited to ease innovation and experimentation in teaching and 
research. The European framework can also, for example,, short-circuit difficulties 
which may exist at a national level and which hinder the dialogue between the academic 
world and those involved in the practice of management".
The selection of Brussels as the core of European networks was the result of a 
non calculated series of events and a calculated use of opportunities. As Marshall 
Robinson stressed in one of his reports to the Ford Foundation,
"Brussels has been selected as the site /of EIASM/ following a long series of 
negotiations in which Geneva and Rotterdam were also considered. The issue was 
resolved when Belgium supplemented its strong substantive case by offering $1,3 
million worth of offices, seminar facilities and equipment and a library collection and 
computer facilities."
Selection of Brussels for EIASM created also a competitive advantage for also 
having EFMD located in the same area. But the question is, how a series of 
opportunities created by the previous existence of associative strategies generated 
a network system? I think that a reasonable answer could be found by applying to 
this context Alfred D. Chandler's conceptualization of the relationship between 
strategy and structure. The shift between associative strategy and systemic 
networks is related to the emergence of a kind of meta-organisation which found 
its social support in a very restraint strategic group composed by new social 
actors, administrators of management education. One should call this meta-level, 




























































































Significantly in 1968, in most of his reports and memoranda Gaston Deurinck 
insisted on two points. He was against the idea of a central institution, preferring 
the Belgian way of setting up co-operative arrangements with universities, within 
the Common market, and he defended the idea that "it was necessary to go into 
the management o f European management schools".
A few years later Roger Talpaert transformed this idea into one of the main 
projects of EFMD research activity. The final report of the project “Management 
of Management", was published in 1978 with a very nice title L'arroseur arrosé, 
which actually could be interpreted as a metaphor for the inversion in competitive 
advantages between US and Europe and which was derived from a very famous 
theatre plot. In his conclusions Talpaert wrote:
"As in many other fields, the major advances which can be hoped for in the field of 
management education and research will, over the next decades, be launched at the 
European level -or they will not take place at all. There are two meanings to this: ./../ 
there is a need for /a! second leap forward and it has to come quickly. For the previous 
one was concerned almost exclusively with optimistic resources /../ in a perspective of 
organisations producing goods and services, to a large extent disregarding social 
activity. Attempts have been made in the USA to overcome this dead-lock, but they 
have failed /../. For /../ the progress of the first wave brought up a great rigidity of 
standards and institutions /../, a whole set of conditions constituting a powerful brake 
on change. In Europe, where the American rise has often been badly and only partially 
copied, the situations are much less set. On the level of Europe as a whole, resistance 
to a new wave would be much less great /../ a "mixed" social organisation does not 
isolate the enterprise as a producer of goods and services so much from other social 
groups./../. The next major advantage in management will be European in a second 
meaning. It cannot be expected in any single European country in particular, but only in 
Europe as a whole"112.
This articulated complementary between national dimension and trans-national 
scale was significantly considered as the main competitive advantage of European 
management education vis-à-vis the United States. It was certainly the basic 
element legitimising the social role of managers of management and to 
strengthening the development of networks as structured systems.
"Social systems, and in particular the organisation of teaching, of which management 
education and research are part, are at least as set in each European country taken 
separately as they are in the US."-
Talpaert observed-




























































































"Flexibility is only possible on the European level as a whole because it is only feasible 
to bring together there in dynamic sets the isolated pieces blocked at the level of 
individual countries. Secondly, because there is no European country, even among the 
biggest which is sufficiently large to justify the requisite concentration of resources to 
induce major progress".
Eastern European Programs
Further developments of European research and teaching programs during the 
80's testify that the networks approach was a successful strategy. However as to 
what concerns competitive cooperation between US and European management 
education, many questions, are still open. Was European competitive advantage, 
which was announced at the end of the seventies, a mere promise? Could one 
think to the present in the same terms and look to the future with a similar 
perspective?
This question clearly overpasses the limits of this work but it is actually, as stated 
at the beginning, part of its problematic background. The effects of the great 
transition of 1989, especially in Eastern countries are far from clear. The impact 
of American models in those countries especially in management is however 
evidence. The problem of continuity and discontinuities in relation with the first 
of the Ford Foundation’s grants, to develop management education in Eastern 
countries in the period of the grand design and intensive development of Western 
programs, is a crucial starting point. Did those programs contributein some way 
to the preparation of a new environment, both in terms of the business elite and 
entrepreneurial behaviours? Were the group which had been active in supporting 
Ford Foundation’s policy, still active in the late eighties? What was the role of 
historical memory in producing new strategies? This topic clearly goes beyond, in 
its complex implications, the subject of my work. Except perhaps in one point 
which, in conclusion, should be considered. What was the role of European 
institutions and networks in developing or at least in cooperating with Ford 
Foundation’s policy in Eastern Europe?
Asymmetries at work in the dissemination of management education programs in 
Western European countries, emerged dramatically in Eastern programs. 
Programs which had started in July 1970 with a grant of $600,000 to develop 
exchanges between Polish and Hungarian management education institutions. 
With stronger difficulties, in the following years the program was extended to 




























































































Management education in Poland and Hungary presented similar patterns which 
could partly be compared with the Western countries situation, as was stated in a 
report of March 1970:
“Management education in Poland has a strong institutional base. The Polish 
Management development Center is the best we have yet seen in Eastern Europe and is 
better than all but a few institutions in Western Europe The Polish universities, as 
elsewhere in Europe, are in an untidy situation with management studies. But in Poland 
they have now accepted the fact that management is a proper area for university study 
and that undergraduate students can take some work in this field/../ Unlike the 
Hungarians whose commitment in the economic reform is much deeper, the Poles 
appear to have a continuing curiosity about US models of thought. Among the East 
European countries, Poles, along with the Czechs, appear to have the greatest natural 
affinity form management studies are likely to become our major East European 
customer in this field”.
The perception of a differentiated environment, stimulated the process of 
differentiation of Ford Foundation’s programs and polices. In Hungary, for 
example, the dominant pattern was the development of the management game, 
based on a NYU program. The Ford Foundation’s experiment, on a joint basis, 
including NYU, Karl Marx University and the Ford Foundation, was supported 
with a grant of $76,405 by a research whose aim was the improvement of 
understanding of the areas of interpersonal impact, transfer of skills and 
knowledge, through a process of adaptation to the Hungarian context of 
“simulation strategies”. In a report on this subject it was clearly stated that:
‘The gradual relaxation of political tensions between East and West, and the growing 
interdependence of national economies has contributed to increase interest on the part 
of both Western and East European companies to establish trade contacts As a result, 
there is a need on both sides for better understanding of the business and managerial 
environments of the trading partners. This is especially true in the case of American 
firms since there have been major changes in the international business environment of 
many of the East European countries and information on current situation is limited. 
Area of particular interests include the nature of the markets and methods of entry into 
hem, regulation influencing foreign investment opportunities and the nature of the 
managerial environment including decision autonomy, incentive structure and 
managerial freedom”" 3.
The basic differences vis-à-vis the Western European context, according to 
American observers, were related less to the demand of management education 
than to structural characters of the industrial environment dominated by a highly 
centralized planning and direction and poor quality central control. 13
113 Report on NYU Hungarian Management Game, Brief Summary project, pp;7-9 [FFA, Reel 




























































































“The government has lacked the ability to closely monitor performance, except in 
accordance with rather crude criteria, such as the achievement of simple volume 
outputs quotas - are poorly stated-./ / Thus the managers of socialist enterprises have 
had limited managerial discretion available to them. Decisions regarded as normal for 
Western managers, such as product mix, marketing, capital investment and employment 
levels were not in their ends”.
In terms of social constraints the American observers detected however elements 
of comparison with Western countries. I would say that, at the end of the sixties a 
comparison was really only possible for a few European countries. As for 
example Italy, where the role of ideological constraints, political sophistication 
patterns and, in particular, the dominant relevance of individualistic approach, in 
terms of initiative in promoting both new educational enterprises and pressures to 
institutional reforms were especially evident. In Hungary, a determinant role was 
played by Rector Szabo of the Karl Mark University. In Romania on the contrary 
the lack of strong leadership had negative effects in the development of the 
program.
Actually since the beginning of the Eastern European Program the interaction 
with Western European schools was perceived as an important factor, when 
compared to the large diffusion of economic planning experiments and the 
relevant role played in Western countries and especially in France and Italy by 
state intervention in economic and industrial policies.
The first attempt to create channels of communication among Western and 
Eastern areas were related to a process of integration of Polish and Hungarian 
graduate students within the existing program of the major business schools like 
IMEDE (with tjie ITP program"4) and INSEAD. A second possible channel was 
the development of a European case method clearinghouse which was supposed 
to include scholars from Poland and Hungary, but did not really worked form this 
point of view14 15.
114 M. Robinson Letter to Jack Moscatelli, IMEDE June 23, 1970 [FFA, Reel n° 2151 Grant n° 
709046, section 1 ]. See also M. Chamberlain Memorandum: Hungarian and Polish 
participation to the Harvard Lausanne Program in business administration June 24, 1970,
(ivi).
115 M. Robinson letter to Dean Georges Lombard April 3 1972, quoted: I am saddened to see 
so few results affecting the East European situation. As Andy /Towl/ knows, the East 
European were the people who persuaded us of the need for a special effort on cases-yet, 




























































































Another “focal” point should be the European center for advanced management 
studies, which, as stated in a report on Polish management education116 was 
considered the fundamental background for this kind of development.
Actually, EIASM seems to have only played this role during the second period of 
its existence, that is since the mid-seventies in relation with a crucial shift in Ford 
Foundation’s Eastern European program. The program, the Delegated Authority 
Project, which had been previously managed by a cooperative interaction 
between the higher education and research division and the European 
International Affairs program, was farmed out to IREX (International Research 
and Exchange Board) in 1973. Actually this project was prepared since 1972 but 
not without resistance from some officers. A report worthy of attention is one that 
was sent to Marshall Robinson in November 1972 form Ivo Lederer, an EIA 
officer arguing that,
‘The principal mandate of IREX is to service the main national academic interests and 
in that framework the field of management education has not been primary /../ For a 
score of reason it would not predictable to switch from a direct Foundation 
involvement in this area of concern to an IREX administered program, at least not 
without causing some disequilibrium in existing IREX programs and an additional 
strain on a small staff which also has no expertise in this field. Eastern Europe 
continues to be a relatively modest but not unimportant part of the Foundation’s 
concern abroad, especially in Europe. Within EIA the trend has been to continue with 
important ongoing projects and to find ways of developing closer links between the two 
European halves. For that reason I recently expressed interest in stimulating East 
European participation in your Brussels center”" 7.
Actually when the project was finally farmed out to IREX the remaining balances 
were used by Higher Education and research to bring Eastern Europe more 
closely into the US-oriented Western European management education network, 
particularly through a grant to EIASM to backstop Polish participation in the 
Institute’s programs.118
Other recipients were IIASA, INSEAD and a European consortium for ITP 
programs. Actually, the role of IIASA, which entered in its operational phase 
precisely, in 1972, when the IREX transfer began to be discussed, should be 
considered more attentively, in a long-term perspective, including the eighties,
116 M. Robinson, H. Swearer, Memorandum: Management Education Poland and Yugoslavia, 
March 30, 1970[FFA, Reel 2151 Grant n° 709046, section 1],
117 Ivo J. Lederer, East European Management Program (HE&R-EIA). Memorandum to M. 
Robinson November 15, 1972 [FFA, Reel n° 2151 Grant n° 709046, section 4].
118 M. Chamberlain, Memorandum to Howard S. Dressner and Me George Bundy , August 26, 




























































































which were characterized by the development of a research project on negotiation 
strategy, with H. Raiffa, and by the beginning of Hofstede’s studies on cross- 
cultural management. This subject bypasses the aim of my work and will be 
certainly developed in other contributions.
At a first glance, the role of Western institutions in the development of Eastern 
programs do not seem particularly relevant, the reason for which, I have 
explained superficially. Here I can develop only some hypothesis related to the 
period of the seventies. The problem demands, of course, further investigation, 
with a long-term approach involving the eighties and the nineties (that is the 
period after 1989). It is true that the Eastern program was not simply an extension 
of the “highly successful program in Western Europe”. As stated in a 1976 
report;
“The program represented the first major direct Foundation venture into Eastern 
Europe reflecting its growth of interest in that region. Although the Foundation had 
supported academic exchange program since the late 1950s, the Management training 
program was in fact the first, large scale and functionally oriented Foundation program 
in the Eastern Socialist".119
119 D. Berry and A Korbanski, Evaluation o f Management Education Programs in Hungary, 





























































































There are many reasons why European schools and programs were only partially 
involved in the Eastern project. 1 can enumerate some of them in relation to the 
field analysis previously developed. First of all, it should be considered that 
European enterprises took the initiative to get involved in Eastern strategies since 
the mid-Sixties that is when the big escort of Western management education 
took place. Secondly the role of President Johnson’s project and later on the role 
of the IIASA in Laxemburg was crucial in establishing channels of bilateral 
relation to which European support was complementary but not determinant. 
Actually most of the consultants involved in Eastern programs were American, 
with leading roles in Western European institutions (like Dean Berry) or in 
American Universities (like Andrej Korbanski).
Berry and Korbanski appeared in the Eastern scenario in a delicate period of 
transition when Ford Foundation’s involvement in this area came to an end and it 
was necessary to strengthen the relations of the programs which should be 
completed with the existing European institutions. Berry and Korbanski wrote 
that, “Western Europe could be used as a less expensive substitute to the USA, 
for Eastern European visits”120. However, this role of subsidiary is not so evident, 
at least, the interest in developing strong relationship with Eastern European 
institutions was not so strong in Western areas. One should certainly consider the 
role of the political context in the mid Seventies which appeared increasingly 
worse when compared to the mid and late Sixties. But one should consider also 
“field dynamics”, that is the increasing competition of European business schools 
with an international outlook in controlling the production of international case 
studies, especially after the creation of a European Harvard at Mont Pelerin.
For example, consider a report of CEI (Centre d’Etudes Industrielles 
located in Geneva) in which it is clearly stated that:
“Efforts have been made, notably at INSEAD and 1MEDE, to generate European 
cases. However most of these cases treat problems arising within a given European 
country. Most available material listed s international concerns the foreign operations of 
US parent companies. Thus, while both European based and international material exist 
separately there is an almost total lack of a combination of the two /../ The entry of 
Harvard into Europe and its ambitious program for surveying the available cases, 
stimulating case writing and developing skills in case preparation and teaching my of 
course result in the production of some international European cases. Still, it does not




























































































appear that the development of international teaching material will be the primary aim 
of the Harvard effort.”121
Actually CEI was the most active among the European Business Schools in 
developing contacts with Eastern countries, and in strengthening the necessity of 
an accurate design for each programs, based not only on “technology of 
management” which are universally valid, but also on the “social know-how of 
management” which is not “universally valid”, because is culturally conditioned.
“To be effective,” the director of CEI affirmed, “it has to be compatible with the value 
systems in a given culture, in a given country /.../ The Soviets have also been intrigued 
by American management know-how just as West Europeans, with however somewhat 
greater risks to themselves. They have in fact been trying to transpose some of the 
Occidental know how in management.”122
In the Seventies, however, European resistance did not develop into a strategic 
field of research, which could implement the reflection on patterns of transfer, 
eventually by extending to Eastern Europe the social know-how in adapting and 
reshaping models which was, as we have seen, a specificity of European 
“behaviour” vis-à-vis the American impact in management education.
European networking processes at this time were mostly devoted to implementing 
integration of programs among Western European area, rather than to consolidate 
(and eventually “export”) a European management pattern, based precisely on a 
built-in cultural polyvalence, on a permanent intellectual extra territoriality. This 
limited implementation of channels of communication with Eastern Europe 
countries depended, partly,- at least for the period considered in this work- on 
political and diplomatic circumstances. A famous study of John Newhouse and 
Peter Hassner123 stressed the fact that: “Any attempt to rush into intimate links 
with Eastern Europe before the community is consolidated in the West will be 
self-defeating.”
One should also consider the effects produced by the institutional development of 
European business schools with an international character. Since 1976, for 
example, INSEAD had developed a strong attention to Japanese patterns both in 
research and entrepreneurialship with the creation of the Center Euro-Asie. The
121 A Proposal for the Implementation of a New Concept in International management 
development. A submission to the Ford Foundation prepared by CEI December 27, 1971 
Appendix K7: Development of European based International Teaching Material [FFA, Reel 
n° 1955 Grant n° 72355, section 5],
122 R. Hawrylyshyn, Management Education. An International Perspective, Asfor Meeting, 
1973.




























































































first developments of EFMD, with its statutory provision that the Chairman of the 
“Board of Trustees” be a businessman and the pre-eminence of a top level 
business representation, virtually could create the conditions to develop contacts 
with Eastern European business environment. But when the first director, 
Meijnen, resigned, another orientation prevailed. It could be summarized by 
referring to interesting observations, which were made recently as comments to a 
paper of mine, by Roger Talpaert:
“The EFMD remained something akin to a weaker version of AACSB (because of a 
considerable number of individual members, inherited from IUC membership) instead of 
a small Ford Foundation for Management Education in Europe.”
In a few words, EFMD did not meet its strategic dimension. 124 
Thus the limited development of “management of management” for Universities 
and training institutions, (the Herbert Simon’s dynamic and unstable intersection 
between “oil and water”), seems to have created, at least in the seventies an 
obstacle in strengthening European competitive-cooperation strategy, in the 
“world wide campus” of management education. When the communist world 
collapsed the American patterns were again the “models to imitate”, at least in 
Russia and perhaps also in other Eastern European countries.
Management of diversities, however seems to become a relevant problem also in 
those areas. Both in the form of a “war of degrees” and in the form of networking 
and institutional cooperation strategies, management of diversities is not an 
invention of the present. It is not the simple product of Euromanagement gospel, 
but reveals historical roots and a double facet, it represents in fact a constraint as 
well as a real asset, perhaps the most relevant competitive advantage of European 
management education environment, in terms of historical selected pattern (Marc 
Bloch).
Ford Foundations’ cross-fertilization policy, therefore, is a revealer as well a 
catalyser in a process which had large implications for European integration. 
Acting as a sort of large-scale “cultural entrepreneur”, Ford Foundation’s role is 
irreducible to the static function of a “gatekeeper” of hegemony. On the contrary, 
as I have tried to demonstrate, the development of competitive-cooperation as a 
distinctive pattern of European actors behaviour and institutional strategies in 
management education was also an effect of the system of interactions between 
actors and projects produced by Ford Foundation’s policy and negotiation 
activities, in shaping and reshaping institutional and educational “design”, as a 
crucial challenge in building trans-cultural societies.
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